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CORPORATE CRIME LEGISLATION:  
A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS 
VIKRAMADITYA S. KHANNA*
ABSTRACT 
Corporate crime has once again become an important issue on the U.S. 
legislative agenda, leading Congress and the various regulatory bodies to 
tighten the law and enhance honesty and completeness in disclosure. 
However, the continued and rather explosive growth of corporate crime 
legislation leaves one with a rather strange puzzle: how can such a state of 
the world arise? After all, corporations and business interests are 
considered some of the most, if not the most, powerful and effective 
lobbyists in the country. Yet, we witness the continued expansion of 
legislation that criminalizes their behavior (one estimate suggests over 
300,000 federal regulatory offenses that can be prosecuted criminally). 
How could this have happened? This paper sets out to explain this puzzle.  
Overall, my analysis suggests that most corporate crime legislation 
arises when there is a large public outcry over a series of corporate 
scandals during or around a downturn in the economy. In such situations, 
Congress must respond. Corporate crime legislation may be the preferred 
response for some corporate interests because it satisfies public outcry 
while imposing relatively low costs on those interests, thereby avoiding 
legislative and judicial responses that are more harmful to their interests 
and sometimes deflecting criminal liability away from managers and 
executives and onto corporations. This explains not only the impressive 
growth of corporate crime legislation but also leads to some surprising 
normative conclusions. In particular, it suggests that if one starts with the 
view that there is under-deterrence of corporate wrongdoing, then one 
would probably prefer to reduce corporate criminal liability and focus 
more on corporate civil and managerial liability. 
 * Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Fall 2003; Associate 
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; John M. Olin Faculty Fellow 2002–2003; S.J.D. 
Harvard Law School, 1997. Email: vskhanna2004@yahoo.com, vskhanna@umich.edu, or 
vkhanna@bu.edu. I thank the John M. Olin Foundation for funding support and Jonathan Barnett, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate crime is back in the news.1 The last two years have seen 
some of the most spectacular revelations of corporate wrongdoing in U.S. 
history, leading to a significant drain on the economy2 and to the 
enactment of various measures, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002.3 This new law adds to the already sprawling area of corporate 
criminal liability.4 Indeed, even before Sarbanes-Oxley, the estimated 
number of federal criminal offenses for which a corporation could be 
convicted was well over 300,000, covering a wide range of areas such as 
environmental, securities, banking, and antitrust violations.5 With such 
tremendous breadth and so many new measures being debated and 
enacted—sometimes rather quickly—it seems to be an appropriate time to 
think more broadly about how we might regulate behavior in the corporate 
sphere to prevent or deter the kinds of wrongdoing we have witnessed in 
the recent past. 
Shavell, Henry Smith, Linda Sugen, Bob Weisberg, Ben  Zipursky, and participants at the Columbia 
Law School Seminar in Law & Economics, Harvard Law School Corporate Crime Seminar, University 
of Michigan Law School Legal Theory Workshop, Stanford Law School Seminar in Law & 
Economics, and Fordham Law School Faculty Workshop for helpful comments and discussions. I 
would also like to thank Nate Howell, Shannon Nestor, Kristin Jenkins, Jay Krawitz, George Qi, 
Dennis Recca, Steve Weaver, and Natalie Wong-Brink for excellent research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., Daniel Eisenberg, More Reform and Less Hot Air, TIME, July 22, 2002, at 24–25; 
Lee Walczak & Richard S. Dunham, Corporate Crime: Why It’s Not Sticking to Republicans, BUS. 
WK., Oct. 7, 2002, at 57 (referring to a “corporate crime wave” starting with the Enron collapse). 
 2. Between August 2001 and August 2002, the NASDAQ lost 29% of its value, dropping from 
approximately $2,688,686,785 to $1,921,970,173 (both numbers in thousands). The three markets 
combined (NASDAQ, NYSE, and Amex) lost 16% of their value between August 2001 and August 
2002. See Comparing Three Markets: NASDAQ, NYSE & Amex, available at 
http://marketdata.nasdaq.com/asp/Sec1Summary.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). 
 3. See generally Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–
204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). The 
Sentencing Guidelines were recently amended to reflect the directives in Sarbanes-Oxley. See UNITED 
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: INCREASED PENALTIES UNDER THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/S-
Oreport.pdf [hereinafter SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT]. See generally U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES § 8 (1995) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. 
 4. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the 
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 216–19 (1991) 
[hereinafter Coffee, Reflections]. For a flavor of the breadth of corporate criminal liability, see 
RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING § 9.7, at 553–84 (1994) [hereinafter 
GRUNER] (discussing fines in the antitrust, environmental, and food and drug arenas), § 9.5.5, at 551–
52 (discussing fines for money laundering and related offenses). 
 5. See Coffee, Reflections, supra note 4, at 216 & n.94 (noting that “there are over 300,000 
federal regulations that may be enforced criminally,” as estimated by Stanley Arkin, “a well known 
practitioner in the field of white collar crime, at the George Mason Conference in October 1990” and 
citing to Leary, The Commission’s New Option That Favors Judicial Discretion in Corporate 
Sentencing, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 142, 144 n.10 (1990)).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/3
p 95 Khanna book pages.doc4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] CORPORATE CRIME LEGISLATION 97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, legal scholarship has examined many aspects of the imposition 
of criminal liability on corporate entities;6 however, there remains a 
largely unanswered fundamental question: how is there so much corporate 
crime legislation given that it targets groups (corporate interests) that 
should be effective at lobbying against criminalization of their behavior?7 
This seems puzzling because we would expect that well-organized and 
well-funded groups (such as corporations) should obtain a large measure 
of what they want through legislation. Yet, in the context of corporate 
crime legislation the corporations seem to be losing the battle.8 What 
might explain this outcome?  
Overall, my analysis suggests that most of the important players, 
including many corporations and management, have reasons to support 
 6. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An 
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (discussing corporate liability 
regimes); John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into 
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing 
Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141 
(1983) (arguing that retribution and deterrence are two primary goals of corporate criminal law); 
Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833, 
834 (2000) (stating that “even in the corporate context, moral condemnation remains a valid aim of the 
criminal law”); Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top Management Matter, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 1215 (2003) [hereinafter Top Management] (arguing that the current setting of corporate sanctions 
relying on the involvement of top management in wrongdoing needs refinement); V.S. Khanna, 
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) 
[hereinafter Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability] (discussing corporate criminal liability compared 
to other liability strategies and concluding that corporate criminal liability is rarely desirable); V.S. 
Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 
B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999) [hereinafter Khanna, Corporate Fault] (discussing the incentive effects of 
corporate fault standards); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of 
Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999) [hereinafter Laufer]; Joseph Vining, Corporate Crime 
and the Religious Sensibility, 5 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 313 (2003). 
 7. Few papers address the political dynamics of corporate crime legislation in much depth. See 
Jeffrey S. Parker, Rules Without . . . : Some Critical Reflections on the Federal Corporate Sentencing 
Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 397 (1993) [hereinafter Parker].  
 8. For a discussion of lobbying and rent-seeking, see generally TOWARDS A THEORY OF A 
RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 1980). 
There are a number of papers that examine regulation from the perspective of political economy. For a 
sampling, see Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983) [hereinafter Becker]; Laura N. Beny, The Political Economy of 
Insider Trading Legislation and Enforcement: International Evidence, Discussion Paper No. 348, John 
M. Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business, Harvard Law School 2002 [hereinafter Beny], 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center; Sam Peltzman, Toward a More 
General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976) [hereinafter Peltzman]; Mark J. Roe, 
Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217 passim (1998) [hereinafter Backlash]; Mark J. Roe, Political 
Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000) 
[hereinafter Political Preconditions]. See also Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Toward an 
Economic Theory of Criminal Procedure, B.U. Sch. L. Working Paper No. 01-02, 7 (2002), available 
at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_files/HyltonKhanna033001.pdf [hereinafter Hylton & 
Khanna]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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some corporate crime legislation. This is because it helps to avoid or 
mitigate legislative and judicial alternatives—such as new forms of 
corporate civil liability and managerial criminal liability—that would be 
even more costly to corporate interests. Most corporate crime legislation 
arises at times when there is a large public outcry over a series of 
corporate scandals during or around a downturn in the economy. In such a 
situation, Congress must respond. Corporate crime legislation may be the 
preferred response for some corporate interests because it satisfies the 
public outcry while imposing relatively low costs on those interests, 
thereby avoiding legislative and judicial responses that are more harmful 
to their interests and sometimes deflecting criminal liability away from 
managers and executives and onto corporations. In this respect corporate 
crime legislation is a substitute for these other responses that are less 
favored by certain corporate interests. I call this the substitution theory of 
corporate crime legislation. Moreover, my analysis suggests some 
surprising normative conclusions. In particular, it suggests that if one 
starts with the view that there is under-deterrence of corporate 
wrongdoing, then one would probably prefer to reduce corporate criminal 
liability and focus more on corporate civil and managerial liability. This 
raises serious questions about our current regulation in this area. 
Part II begins by examining the primary legal doctrine used to hold 
corporations liable for the acts of their agents and the impressive breadth 
of corporate crime legislation. I then examine the political dynamics that 
might explain the vast amount of corporate crime legislation. Parts III and 
IV focus on the incentives of corporate interests and detail the substitution 
theses. Part V examines the incentives of the other players (e.g., 
legislators, prosecutors, judges, victims, and the general public), while 
Part VI considers the normative implications from my analysis. Part VII 
explores alternative political explanations for the growth of corporate 
crime legislation and argues that they do not alter the primary argument in 
this Article. Part VIII concludes. 
II. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AN INTRODUCTION 
At the federal level and in many states the primary method of holding 
corporations liable (civilly or criminally) for the behavior of their agents is 
respondeat superior.9 This requires that the agent be acting “within the 
 9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (Proposed Official Draft, 2000); Khanna, 
Corporate Fault, supra note 6, at 369–70 (citing GRUNER, supra note 4, § 3.4.2, at 198–203, § 4.1–.2, 
at 263–84). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/3
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scope of employment” and with some intent to benefit the corporation.10 
Respondeat superior is quite broad and will impose liability on the 
corporation regardless of whether the involved agent was an executive or a 
line employee.11  
The breadth of respondeat superior liability is reflected in the vast 
amount of corporate behavior that is subject to criminal penalties. 
Corporations and their agents can be held criminally liable for violations 
of the environmental laws,12 securities laws,13 banking laws,14 antitrust 
laws,15 anti-bribery laws,16 and a host of other laws.17 Indeed, some 
 In states that follow the Model Penal Code (MPC) instead of respondent superior, corporate 
responsibility for mens rea offenses usually requires the involvement of a high-level corporate official, 
not simply any agent. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1985); Laufer, supra note 6, at 1384–85 
(discussing “substantial authority” under the Model Penal Code); Anthony Ragozino, Replacing the 
Collective Knowledge Doctrine with a Better Theory for Establishing Corporate Mens Rea: The Duty 
Stratification Approach, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 423, 449 (1995). The MPC approach is in the minority in 
the U.S. and is not followed at the federal level and as such I will not discuss it in any greater depth at 
this time. Similarly, in some overseas jurisdictions corporate criminal liability can only be imposed if 
the “alter ego” or some group (or person) of considerable importance in the corporate structure was 
involved in the wrongdoing. See Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 6, at 1490–91. It is 
noteworthy that few countries have corporate criminal liability and those that do have a much more 
restrained version of it compared to the U.S. See id. at 1488–91.  
 10. See Khanna, Corporate Fault, supra note 6, at 370 (citing Developments in the Law—
Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
1227, 1247 (1979)); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise 
and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345, 1349 (1982). 
 11. See Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through 
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1247 (1979) [hereinafter Developments]. Note that 
respondeat superior liability is in addition to any personal liability that may attach to the agent. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY Ch. 11 To. 3 Gen. Matls. (1958 App.) Appendix Court Citations 
(respondeat superior does not defeat agent liability); GRUNER, supra note 4, § 3.4.2, at 199–200); 
Khanna, Corporate Fault, supra note 6, at 370 (citing KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY, § 401, at 130 (2d ed., 1992) [hereinafter BRICKEY]. 
 12. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2000); Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000).  
 13. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000); Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–78k (2000); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a–180a–64 (2000); Public 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 
Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A and 18 U.S.C.A.). 
 14. See Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(u) (1988 
& Supp. V 1993); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (1988 & Supp. V 
1993); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(k) (1988 & Supp. 
V 1993).  
 15. See The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000); The 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000). 
 16. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78m(d)(1), 78m(g)–(h), 
78dd–2, 78ff (1994); Bribery of Public Officials, 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 2004). 
 17. See, e.g., Currency Transaction Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 371 
(1994) (conspiracy against the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) (fining whoever knows of the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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estimates suggest that even prior to recent events there were over 300,000 
federal offenses that could be prosecuted criminally against corporations.18  
The magnitude of criminal liability for corporate behavior raises many 
interesting questions, but the one that will occupy this paper is a political 
one. How is it that there is so much corporate crime legislation given that 
it targets groups (corporate interests) that should be quite good at lobbying 
against criminalization of their behavior?  
Before delving into this question, a few matters are worth clarifying. 
First, my discussion is not meant to suggest that corporate interests are a 
unified interest group. There is a rich and deep public choice literature 
arguing that regulation is often the result of lobbying battles between 
different business interests so that some business interests are benefited by 
regulation and others are harmed (e.g., the creation of regulatory barriers 
to entry deterring new entry or making it more costly).19 Such arguments 
provide strong explanations for regulations more generally, but my interest 
is in examining corporate crime legislation. Thus, I discuss incentives with 
respect to corporate crime legislation. I focus on the incentives of groups 
that would normally oppose regulation (I refer to them as “corporate 
interests” for expositional ease) and argue that these groups may often 
prefer corporate crime legislation over increases in corporate civil liability 
for reasons identified in Parts III and IV of this Article.20 I return to 
examine some of the issues raised by the battles between corporate interest 
commission of a felony and conceals this information or does not report it to a judge or some other 
civil or criminal authority in a prompt fashion). 
 18. See supra note 5. 
 19. This is a vast literature. For a flavor see generally Becker, supra note 8; David D. Haddock & 
Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, With an Application to Insider 
Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987); Kyle D. Logue, If Taxpayers Can’t Be Fooled, 
Maybe Congress Can: A Public Choice Perspective on the Tax Transition Debate, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1507 (2000); Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental 
Quality Regulation, 25 J. L. & ECON. 99 (1982); Peltzman, supra note 8; Richard L. Revesz, 
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001) 
[hereinafter Revesz]; Carlos D. Ramirez & Christian Eigen-Zucchi, Why Did the Clayton Act Pass? An 
Analysis of the Interest Group Hypothesis, Draft 2003 (on file with author); George J. Stigler, The 
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) [hereinafter Stigler]. 
 20. The corporate interest groups who oppose regulation may vary depending on the regulation at 
issue, specifically who does it hurt most. My reference to corporate interest groups means those 
corporate interest groups, in a particular context, that would oppose regulation generally (rather than 
corporate crime legislation specifically). Correlatively, the groups that normally favor increases in 
regulation may prefer increases in corporate civil liability, rather than corporate crime legislation. 
However, these groups may find it difficult to lobby vociferously against criminal liability when they 
also lobby in favor of increases in civil liability.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/3
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groups in Part VII and conclude that they do not alter my primary 
conclusions. 21  
Second, the focus of this Article is corporate crime legislation. Most of 
the criminal liability that corporations face in the U.S. stems from acts of 
Congress. However, the initial development of corporate criminal liability, 
driven predominantly by case law, was motivated by different factors than 
the later, largely legislative, growth of corporate criminal liability.22 The 
early case law dates from the 1600s in England and involved instances of 
public harms (e.g., public nuisances) that municipalities had a duty to 
prevent or clean up.23 For such harms, private enforcement was unlikely 
because few people would have the incentive or the information to pursue 
the case.24 Thus, public enforcement was needed, and at the time the 
primary form of it was criminal liability.25 In addition, one also needed 
liability against the municipality (i.e., corporations) to maintain deterrence 
because individuals responsible for the public nuisance were either 
difficult to identify or judgment-proof.26 Corporate criminal liability then 
provided the only available method for combining public enforcement and 
corporate liability and thus served a useful enforcement function.27 Indeed, 
for the first 200–250 years of its existence, corporate criminal liability 
grew mainly to fill such gaps and was largely contained to only a few 
areas.28  
However, by the early 1900s public civil enforcement was a realistic 
alternative to public criminal enforcement, and by the 1960s public civil 
 21. I should note that the primary focus of this Article is not whether corporate crime legislation 
is in the public interest (i.e., normatively desirable). Nonetheless, my analysis does have normative 
implications, which I discuss in Part VI. My discussion also does not delve into theories behind the 
administrative process underlying these laws and whether, and when, it may tend towards the public 
interest. For excellent discussions of this and related matters, see Steven P. Croley, Theories of 
Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998); Steven P. Croley, 
Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (2000).  
 22. See L.H. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW 16–18 
(1969) [hereinafter LEIGH]; BRICKEY, supra note 11, at 130. 
 23. See LEIGH, supra note 22, at 16–18; BRICKEY, supra note 11, at 130. 
 24. See Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 6, at 1486–86 n.45 (referring to 
BRICKEY, supra note 11, at 421–22). 
 25. See Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging Streams of 
Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573, 587 & n.37 (1994) [hereinafter 
Hughes] (stating that it was only in the late 1800s that agencies developed civil enforcement and 
information gathering powers). 
 26. See James R. Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 KY. L.J. 
73, 82–84 (1976) [hereinafter Elkins] (noting identifiability concerns); Khanna, Corporate Criminal 
Liability, supra note 6, at 1480–86. 
 27. See Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 6, at 1486 nn.53 & 54. 
 28. See BRICKEY, supra note 22, § 2.04–2.09, at 70–86; Elkins, supra note 26, at 93–96; Khanna, 
Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 6, at 1480–84. 
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enforcement had the same (and sometimes greater) information gathering 
powers as public criminal enforcement.29 Somewhat ironically, most of the 
growth of corporate crime legislation occurred when public civil 
enforcement was a realistic alternative and when corporate criminal 
liability’s enforcement rationale was small or non-existent.30 It is this later 
more dramatic growth that I examine in this Article as opposed to the 
initial development of corporate criminal liability. 
A third matter is that there is little special legislation singling out 
corporations for criminal penalties.31 Rather, criminal legislation is 
generally enacted to apply to “persons” engaged in certain activities, and 
then “person” is defined to include natural persons (i.e., humans) and 
corporate persons.32 Might this affect the lobbying activities of 
corporations? It is doubtful that this would make much difference. If 
corporations find corporate criminal liability costly, then they will lobby 
against it regardless of how it applies to them.33 Corporations may then 
lobby (i) against criminalization of the behavior for any “person,” (ii) for 
provisions that make it harder to attach criminal liability to corporations, 
or (iii) for some kind of “carve–out” that makes it more difficult to hold 
corporations criminally liable.34 Given that the general public is unlikely to 
pay close attention to the exact wording of the statute (due to collective 
action concerns) such strategies may be successful.35 Thus, just because 
there is little specific legislation imposing criminal penalties on 
 29. See Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 6, at 1520–31. 
 30. See id. at 1487–88. 
 31. Cf. GRUNER, supra note 4, at § 3.3, at 179–95. 
 32. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 360–61 (1968) 
[hereinafter PACKER]; John T. Byam, Comment, The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 582, 584–85 (1982) [hereinafter Byam]. This suggests that 
corporate criminal liability is something of an “after-thought” or an “add-on”. See PACKER, supra, at 
360–61; Byam, supra, at 585.  
 33. Corporations may also lobby against enforcement of corporate crime legislation or attempt to 
cut off budgetary funding for it (see infra Part III.B & C). Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
37–94 (1998); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and 
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA LAW REV. 757, 789–810 (1999) [hereinafter Delegation]. Indeed, 
one reason corporations may favor corporate criminal liability (or public enforcement) over civil 
liability (or private enforcement) is because lobbying may occur with respect to enforcement budgets 
largely out of sight of the general public. But see Jeffrey Toobin, The Man Chasing Enron: Why 
America’s C.E.O.s Hate Bill Lerach, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 9, 2002, at 94 [hereinafter Toobin]. 
 34. Safe harbors that are common in the securities regulation field are an example of achieving a 
carve-out. Note that I am not necessarily suggesting that the safe harbors in the securities field are 
examples of corporate lobbying to obtain carve-outs as opposed to simple well-intentioned and 
thought-out moves by the SEC. Rather, I am suggesting that the use of something like a “safe harbor” 
could provide a method of achieving a carve-out.  
 35. See infra Part V.A.  
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corporations does not mean that corporations cannot lobby against 
corporate criminal liability, find “carve-outs” for themselves, or otherwise 
mitigate its effects if they so desire. The real questions are why are there 
not more “carve-outs” and why is there so much potential criminal liability 
for corporations. As I argue in the parts to follow, corporate criminal 
liability may not be the worst thing for corporations.36  
III. THE POLITICAL PUZZLE OF CORPORATE CRIME LEGISLATION AND THE 
SUBSTITUTION THESIS 
To analyze the political dynamics of corporate crime legislation it is 
important to recognize that the politics of criminal law (street or white 
collar) are a story of institutional politics—that is, the politics of the 
institutions and their players—in the criminal context.37 It is then 
important to set out the likely incentives of the important players such as 
Congress, management, corporations, prosecutors, judges, the general 
public, and victims of crime.38  
To begin the analysis it is necessary to obtain a sense of how most 
corporate crime legislation comes to be enacted. The normal pattern of 
 36. Also one final note about how corporate criminal liability comes to be imposed on 
corporations at the federal level. Only the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) can initiate criminal 
proceedings against corporations at the federal level. The DOJ can initiate cases on its own motion, but 
in practice most cases come to the attention of the DOJ through referrals for criminal prosecution from 
other government agencies engaged in various aspects of law enforcement (e.g., the SEC, EPA) or 
through private parties (e.g., qui tam suits under the False Claims Act of 1986, victims in antitrust 
suits). Thus, the pattern of corporate crime enforcement is determined in measure by the activities of 
the DOJ, various other government bodies, and private entities. One might imagine that this would 
complicate the analysis of political incentives a great deal because we have so many players. Although 
clearly the various participants may have different interests and motivations, that does not change the 
fact that no prosecution can be initiated unless the DOJ initiates it. The other enforcement agencies and 
private players clearly may influence how and when the DOJ or the state prosecutors become aware of 
cases, but—given the somewhat overlapping nature of public civil and private civil enforcement—one 
does not expect that too many cases that have some political support for going criminal will not be 
brought to the attention of the DOJ. See generally JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED 
STATES (1978); Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical 
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036 (1972). 
 37. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505 passim (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz]. 
 38. Cf. id. I have not listed some other potential players such as federal investigative agencies 
(FBI, SEC, EPA), the police, defense attorneys and perhaps others. This is largely for analytical 
simplicity. For a discussion of how some of these players may interact, see generally Daniel Richman, 
Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003) 
[hereinafter Agents]. One suspects that the federal civil agencies would probably not oppose expansion 
of criminal liability for corporations because it does not impinge on their ability to bring civil suits. 
Further, the possibility of being able to refer a case for criminal prosecution might be a nice bargaining 
chip for a federal agency to possess when dealing with corporations and especially managers.  
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corporate crime legislation is that it comes on the heels of a large public 
outcry for greater regulation following the revelation of a number of 
events of corporate wrongdoing usually during or around a weak 
economy. This was the case for the federal securities laws, the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, and other legislation surrounding Watergate, insider 
trading legislation in the mid-1980s, and the recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act.39 
Against this backdrop of increased calls for regulation, Congress must act 
as a political matter, and the issue is what it will do.40 However, Congress 
has many options for regulating corporate behavior: it could enhance 
corporate civil liability, enhance corporate criminal liability, enhance 
liability for other parties (e.g., managers, accountants, and so forth), 
increase direct regulation generally, or rely on some combination of these 
options. Which option Congress chooses depends to some extent on the 
lobbying efforts of corporate interests and other interested parties.  
I begin with a discussion of the incentives of corporations and 
executives and then move on to consider the incentives of other parties. 
For purposes of clarity, I examine two sets of congressional options, 
although the analysis would be applicable to other options too. First, I 
compare potential increases in corporate civil liability with corporate 
crime legislation. Second, in Part IV, I examine the impact of corporate 
crime legislation on the incidence of managerial criminal liability—
specifically, that the presence of corporate criminal liability may lead to 
deflection of criminal liability away from managers.  
In comparing increases in corporate civil liability with corporate crime 
legislation it is important to define what these phrases mean. Increases in 
 39. There are many examples of this. See BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 1.02, at 5–6 (discussing 
legislation surrounding Watergate era); JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1–31 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing the securities laws) [hereinafter COX]; JOEL SELIGMAN, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 1–100 (1982) (providing a detailed account of the history 
and politics surrounding the federal securities laws); Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction 
Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 549, 550–51 (1996) (discussing growth of legislation around Watergate era); Revesz, 
supra note 19, at 583–626 (discussing the environmental context); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of 
American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 17–18 (1991) (discussing the Glass-Stegal Act 
as a response to the Great Depression); Backlash, supra note 8, at 234–38 (noting that hostile 
takeovers and harsh bankruptcy policy increases the probability of severe political reaction). Finally, 
the Enron-style scandals have led to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002 in another economic 
downturn. See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 40. Congress may have to act in the sense that when these series of corporate scandals arise 
together the collective action problem faced by the general public and dispersed victims may be 
overcome. If Congress remains silent in the face of this activated group they are likely to face 
considerable difficulty in the next election and may also, in some countries, endanger longer-run 
stability. See Backlash, supra note 8; Larry Reynolds, Washington Gets Tough on White-Collar Crime, 
79 MGMT. REV., Dec. 1990, at 27 [hereinafter Reynolds]. 
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corporate civil liability refer to instances when Congress expands 
corporate civil liability by either increasing the kinds of activities that are 
actionable or by increasing the penalties that corporations may suffer for 
engaging in certain behavior, or both. For example, Congress could make 
acts X, Y, and Z all new civil wrongs. Next, corporate crime legislation 
refers to when Congress expands corporate civil liability somewhat, but 
not to the extent of the large increases in the first option, and also 
criminalizes these new wrongs. For example, Congress could make acts X 
and Y new civil wrongs and also make them new criminal wrongs if 
undertaken with the required mens rea. For ease of exposition, the first 
option is referred to as increases or enhancements in corporate civil 
liability and the second option is referred to as corporate crime legislation 
(i.e., moderate increases in corporate civil liability accompanied by 
criminalization of the underlying behavior).  
Which of these options might corporate interests prefer? I argue that 
some corporate interests prefer corporate crime legislation over 
enhancements in corporate civil liability primarily because corporate 
criminal liability: (i) has been fairly low cost; (ii) results in more targeted 
(and hence less frivolous) enforcement; (iii) can have its enforcement 
more easily influenced by corporate interests; (iv) possesses stronger 
procedural safeguards (e.g., beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof); 
(v) tends not to have high supra-compensatory damages; and (vi) less 
frequently imposes liability on third parties (e.g., accountants).  
A. Low Cost Corporate Crime Legislation—Of Symbolic Measures. 
One of the first things to note about corporate crime legislation is that 
enforcement has traditionally been quite thin—indeed it may appear 
largely symbolic.41 This suggests that corporate crime legislation may not 
 41. The number of prosecutions per year is quite small and has remained nearly constant for the 
last decade, and most prosecutions occur against smaller firms. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2001 [hereinafter SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2001], 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/ch5-2001.PDF (last visited Apr. 12, 2004); Harry 
First, Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, OCCASIONAL PAPERS FROM THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN 
CRIME AND JUSTICE, NYU SCHOOL OF LAW 3–5 (1991) [hereinafter First] (noting that many antitrust 
enforcement actions have been against smaller firms); Cindy Alexander et al., Regulating Corporate 
Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms, 42 J.L. & ECON. 393, 
403 (1999) [hereinafter Alexander et al.]; Parker, supra note 7, at 399–400; Joe Davidson, Sentence 
Rules Mainly Snag Small Firms, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1995, at B3 [hereinafter Davidson] (stating that 
“[t]he commission said 97% of the 280 firms sentenced under the guidelines since they took effect 
have been privately held or controlled by only a small group of shareholders”); Annie Geraghty, 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327, 338 (2002) (noting that the majority of 
defendants sentenced are small, closely held organizations) [hereinafter Geraghty]; Judge Diana E. 
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generally be perceived as a big threat to management and big business.42 
In contrast, corporate civil liability, which is enforced by both government 
agencies and private litigants, has greater enforcement. For corporations, 
the higher likelihood of enforcement in civil liability is an important factor 
because they face essentially monetary sanctions in both civil and criminal 
proceedings.43  
Moreover, the monetary penalties in the civil context are usually 
greater than those in the criminal context.44 Thus, if corporations had the 
Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance 
and Ethics, 1291 PLI/CORP 97, 113 (2002) [hereinafter Murphy] (finding median number of 
employees at convicted corporations to be 20); Jed S. Rakoff, Avoiding Corporate Indictments Under 
New Sentencing Guidelines, BUS. CRIMES BULL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG., Feb. 1994, at 2 [hereinafter 
Rakoff] (stating that Commission data suggests that prosecutors are reluctant to indict public 
companies unless there are very serious offenses by high-level managers).  
 One might view the fact that most convictions arise against small firms as indicative that 
corporate crime legislation benefits incumbent firms and harms smaller firms and that perhaps 
incumbents push for such legislation. Cf. Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities 
Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Mahoney] (arguing that the Securities Act of 
1933 reduced competition among investments banks). I suspect this is often a good explanation for 
regulation generally, but for reasons noted in Part VII, I doubt it provides a strong explanation for 
corporate crime legislation.  
 42. See NANCY K. FRANK & MICHAEL J. LYNCH, CORPORATE CRIME CORPORATE VIOLENCE: A 
PRIMER 126 (1992) [hereinafter FRANK & LYNCH] (criminal sanctions viewed by corporations as a 
“cost of doing business”).  
 43. See KIP SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS 22–30 (1990) [hereinafter 
SCHLEGEL ET AL.]. See also CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: AN ANTHOLOGY 25–26 
(Leonard Orland ed., 1995) [hereinafter Orland]; Alexander et al., supra note 41, at 395. See also 
CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: THE LEGAL, SOCIETAL, AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES 60–66 (Margaret P. 
Spencer & Ronald R. Sims eds., 1995) [hereinafter CORPORATE MISCONDUCT] (calculation of fines).  
 44. See Alexander et al., supra note 41, at 395. See also SCHLEGEL, supra note 43, at 11. There is 
considerable evidence that corporate crime penalties are perceived to be generally lower than corporate 
civil sanctions. See, e.g., William Glaberson, S.E.C. Aide Assails Plan on Punishing Companies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1988, at D6; Stephen Labaton, Corporate Penalty Plan Stirs Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
10, 1988, at D6; Philip Shenon, Ideas & Trends: Proposals for Punishment; The Case of the Criminal 
Corporation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1989, at E28. There are, of course, reputational sanctions imposed 
on corporations from both corporate civil and criminal liability that are relevant in assessing the costs 
of each kind of liability. Most studies of reputational effects on corporations (measured by drops in 
share price associated with revelations of wrongdoing) find that they are (i) sometimes quite large; (ii) 
about the same regardless of the type of proceedings (civil or criminal), holding the kind of 
wrongdoing and official sanction size constant; and (iii) that reputational penalties tend to be 
positively correlated with the size of the official sanction (suggesting that larger official sanctions 
under corporate civil liability may generate greater reputational losses). See Jonathan M. Karpoff & 
John R. Lott, On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damage Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 527, 
570 (1999) [hereinafter Karpoff & Lott] (arguing that “[f]irm values and the use of reputational 
investments to assure contractual performance, however, will be affected by both the size and 
predictability of prospective punitive awards”); Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The 
Reputational Penalty Firms Bear for Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 758 (1993) 
(noting that “reputational cost . . . constitutes most of the cost incurred by firms accused or convicted 
of fraud”); Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: 
Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 491 (1999). This suggests that the presence of reputational losses is 
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choice, they might prefer corporate crime legislation because its 
enforcement is less frequent and its penalties are often lower than those 
under corporate civil liability. Simply put, corporate criminal liability has 
lower expected costs than increases in corporate civil liability.  
One caveat is in order. Over the last decade or so the criminal penalties 
imposed on corporations have increased,45 as have corporate expenditures 
on compliance.46 The increased compliance expenditures suggest that the 
perceived costs of corporate or executive criminal liability have grown 
important, but that corporate civil liability may tend to have greater or similar reputational losses to 
corporate criminal liability. 
 45. Following the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, the penalties imposed on convicted 
corporations have increased perhaps by up to 5 to 10 times their pre-Guideline levels. See Alexander, 
et al., supra note 41, at 409–13. Indeed, penalties in health care, environmental, securities, and 
antitrust fields have all increased over the last decade by quite a lot. See Mary B. Neumayr, An 
Examination of the Criminalization of Commercial Activity (July 25, 2002) [hereinafter Neumayr], 
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/pdf/CrimFinal.pdf. The recent increases under Sarbanes-Oxley 
ratchet up penalties even further. See SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3. 
 It is still possible that expected penalties might be small if detection rates are small. However, 
detection rates for corporate wrongdoing tend to vary with the type of wrongdoing. See Neumayr, 
supra, at 8–11 (discussing qui tam enforcement, which is sometimes considered frivolous). Cf. Jeffrey 
S. Parker, Criminal Sentencing Policy for Organizations, in U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 
DISCUSSION MATERIALS ON ORGANIZATIONAL SANCTIONS (1988), reprinted in 26 AMER. CRIM. L. 
REV. 513 (1989) (stating that the likelihood of detection and conviction for antitrust is estimated by the 
Department of Justice as being about 10%). But see Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don’t Care 
About Computer Crime, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 475 (1997) (noting that for some computer 
crimes, rates of escape may be about 98%).  
 46. See generally SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at § 8C2.5(f); William S. Laufer, 
Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643 (2002); 
Murphy, supra note 41, at 111, 115, 116; Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing 
Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 
1559 (1990).  
 One of the primary corporate responses to the organizational sentencing guidelines has been to 
invest increased resources and effort in promulgating compliance programs that could earn the 
corporation a sanction reduction under the guidelines. Under the guidelines a “reasonably effective” 
compliance program could lead to substantial reductions in corporate penalties. See U.S. SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, HOW THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES WORK: AN OVERVIEW, http://www.ussc.gov/ 
SYMPO/WCSYMPO1.HTM. These compliance programs are, however, generally considered 
expensive to devise and implement and would only be worth the expense if they generated a benefit 
(e.g., reduced penalties and reduced wrongdoing) that was worth the cost. See also Alan Kline et al., 
Cost of Compliance, AMERICAN BANKER, Apr. 19, 2002, available at http://www.americanbanker.com 
(quoting Bob Wilmers, Chairman, M&T Bank Corp. “The cost of regulatory compliance is not 
insubstantial . . . [w]e estimate that our annual cost . . . is now up to $37 Million and counting”); 
ERNST & YOUNG, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS: LEADING PRACTICES SURVEY (2001); 
Robert J. Ambrogi, Browse Your Way to Compliance, Law.com, (Jan. 27, 2003), at 
http://www.law.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/View&c=LawArticle&
cid=1042568695687&live=true&cst=1&pc=0&pa=0 (now defunct) (on file with author) (noting that 
“Times are good for businesses that provide corporate compliance training online. Los Angeles’ Legal 
Knowledge Co., for example, saw contracts for its Web-based Legal Compliance and Ethics Center 
(LCEC) double in the past year, to $100 million.” This is just one corporation that provides only 
training services).
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enough to justify these expenditures, implying that these costs are not 
trivial.47 This may be increasingly true, but it does not change my analysis. 
My analysis requires that corporate civil liability be more costly to 
corporations than corporate criminal liability. Evidence suggests that not 
only has the cost of corporate criminal liability increased recently, but so 
too has the cost of corporate civil liability (and by at least as much).48 
Thus, we would still expect that corporations prefer corporate crime 
legislation over increases in corporate civil liability. 49  
 47. I do not rely on claims by corporations that they are “truly” scared of corporate criminal 
liability because such claims may reflect one of at least three things. First, that corporate criminal 
liability does impose significant costs. Second, corporate criminal liability does not impose large costs, 
but corporations have self-serving reasons to claim that it does (e.g., to prevent more harmful 
measures). Third, that managers are scared by corporate criminal liability because the initiation of a 
prosecution against the corporation might be viewed as a signal that criminal prosecutions against 
managers are likely. See Laufer, supra note 6, at 649–52 (noting that cooperation and presumably 
compliance programs would reduce the likelihood of the corporation being charged, which may help 
evade liability for higher ups).  
 There is a question of how compliance programs became so important in the corporate 
wrongdoing area: who lobbied for them? It appears that both corporate interests and law firms lobbied 
for them. See Daniel Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 348 (1996) 
[hereinafter Fischel & Sykes] (noting that compliance programs are a bonanza for law firms because of 
the business it generates for them); Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of 
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 316 (1991) [hereinafter Macey]; Reynolds, supra note 40, at 27. 
Why might this be? Corporations and management might be scared of government investigations 
revealing personal (i.e., managerial) wrongdoing, and the presence of a reasonable compliance 
program may lead prosecutors not to investigate further and uncover these wrongs or incriminating 
evidence. See Laufer, supra note 6, at 657–60. Also, law firms may not be providing management with 
the best advice about the true risks of liability given that they sell (and hence benefit financially) from 
the provision of compliance services. See Fischel & Sykes, supra. Cf. John C. Coates IV, Explaining 
Variation in Takeover Defenses: “Blame the Lawyers,” 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 passim (2001) 
(discussing how variation in takeover defenses at the IPO stage may be explained by the corporations 
using different law firms).  
 48. See Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 6, at 1514 (noting that “[t]he recent 
increases in the severity of corporate sanctions in both the civil and criminal spheres may indicate a 
belief that sanctions are still not stiff enough to deter undesirable behavior.”). The analysis thus far 
does not indicate how or why corporate penalties increased as much as they did in the guidelines. An 
explanation for this change cannot be explored in the limited space of this Article, but there were 
suggestions that the pre-guidelines sanctions were considered quite low. See Alexander et al., supra 
note 41, at 395. Also, it is possible that, had these increases not gone through, even more costly 
measures could have been undertaken. After all, the guidelines came about on the heels of the 
Watergate scandal, insider trading cases, and the savings and loan debacle. This presumably was 
associated with a large amount of public outcry with corporate wrongdoing. When this is combined 
with the greater impact corporations have on our everyday lives than in the past, one can imagine how 
liability increases might become more common now than in the past. See Khanna, Corporate Criminal 
Liability, supra note 6, at 1481–84.  
 49. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Another noteworthy point is that compliance 
expenditures are not only useful in reducing criminal sanctions, but they may reduce civil sanctions 
too. Compliance programs may reduce the total civil sanction suffered by a corporation in two ways. 
First, sometimes the presence of such programs could lead to a finding of no (or lesser) liability. See 
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 
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B. Targeted Enforcement 
Enforcement of corporate criminal and civil liability occurs in 
somewhat different ways. Corporate civil liability is enforced by both 
government agencies (e.g., the SEC) as well as private litigants,50 whereas 
corporate criminal liability is enforced by the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
only.51 The different sets of enforcers are important to corporate interests. 
This is because private litigants are more likely than government agents to 
bring frivolous suits.52 The core reasons are quite straightforward. First, 
private litigants may receive direct financial gains by pursuing frivolous or 
questionable suits against corporations, whereas government agents 
(1998); Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional 
Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41 (1999); Allan Horwich, Section 11 of 
the Securities Act: The Cornerstone Needs Some Tuckpointing, 58 BUS. LAW. 1 (2002). Second, if 
these programs have a deterrent effect, then the number of wrongs and the number of civil suits 
premised on these wrongs would decrease. Thus, both the magnitude and frequency of civil sanctions 
could decrease. This provides yet another benefit to compliance programs (along with reductions in the 
magnitude and frequency of criminal penalties) that should be weighed against its costs and also 
suggests that it is not simply increases in criminal sanctions that are triggering compliance 
expenditures. Indeed, it might be that the reductions in civil liability motivate the increased 
expenditure in compliance programs. For example, it may be that compliance programs cost $200 
million but reduce criminal penalties by $20 million and civil sanctions by $181 million. Nonetheless, 
the timing of the growth in compliance expenditures seems to coincide with the organizational 
sentencing guidelines (i.e., criminal sanctions), suggesting that they may well be the critical trigger. 
Cf. Laufer, supra note 6, at 650–54 (noting that the issue of corporate compliance got a huge lift 
following the organizational sentencing guidelines); Murphy, supra note 41, at 111, 115, 116 (noting 
large impact of organizational sentencing guidelines on compliance activity). One explanation for this 
might be that the criminal penalties were the amount needed at the margin to trigger the growth of 
compliance programs, although this would assume a fairly accurate sanction-setting policy by the 
government, which may not necessarily be the case. 
 50. See FRANK & LYNCH, supra note 42, at 26–27.  
 51. I am referring to federal corporate crime legislation. State corporate crime laws are enforced 
by state prosecutors. See CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 43, at 36–38.  
 52. This is not to suggest that prosecutors always bring socially desirable suits, but only that they 
tend to bring socially undesirable suits less frequently than private litigants. See Toobin, supra note 33, 
at 9. For these concerns in the context of recent securities regulation, see Selective Disclosure and 
Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, 735 SEC Docket 3 (Aug. 15, 2000) and Stephen 
J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 533, 540–69 
(2002) (discussing the efficiency consequences of Regulation F-D). For discussions on how 
prosecutors’ incentives may diverge from the socially optimal, see Edward L. Glaeser, Daniel P. 
Kessler, & Anne M. Piehl, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug 
Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 261 (2000) [hereinafter Glaeser et al.] (noting that decisions to 
prosecute are often influenced by prosecutors’ interest in running for higher office); Stuntz, supra note 
37, at 533 (noting that “local prosecutors are likely to seek to produce the range of outcomes the public 
desires”); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 662 (2002) 
(noting that police misconduct prosecution occurs only in cases of high public visibility) [hereinafter 
Krug].  
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generally do not.53 Second, given that prosecutors want to maximize 
convictions and are operating within a budget, they will probably use their 
resources on cases they believe are more likely to result in convictions.54 
Presumably, this pushes them away from the weak and frivolous cases and 
toward the more meritorious cases, which as a general matter should be 
easier cases in which to obtain convictions.55 However, in the private 
litigation setting—with class actions, contingency fees, and 
entrepreneurial attorneys—things are likely to be different.56 This is not to 
say government agents cannot benefit from frivolous suits but that as a 
general matter they are less likely to initiate frivolous litigation compared 
to private litigants.57 In light of this, corporate interests might be more 
inclined to prefer less frivolous (read costly) litigation via corporate crime 
 53. See Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON 
REG. 167, 169 (1985) [hereinafter Cohen & Rubin] (noting that “[t]hird, and most important, private 
enforcement agents, unlike government regulators, will possess ongoing economic interests directly 
related to the costs and benefits of public policy implementation.”) (also acknowledging generally that 
government agencies do not have as much incentive as private litigants). See generally Gary S. Becker 
& George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 13 (1974) (suggesting that compensation scheme for public enforcers should emulate scheme 
of private enforcers, given that there is much greater private incentive to enforce). 
 54. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 
61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 807 (1987) [hereinafter Cavanagh] (noting that “[o]n the contrary, given the 
limited resources available to public enforcement agencies, the government presumably is better able 
to take into account relevant enforcement costs and prosecute only those matters which are truly in the 
public interest.”); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So 
High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 71–72 (2001) [hereinafter Ramseyer & Rasmusen]. I do not mean to 
suggest that maximizing convictions is the only thing that prosecutors care about. There may be many 
other things that matter to prosecutors too, but convictions are important. For discussion of some other 
factors that may influence prosecutors see Glaeser et al., supra note 52, at 261; Krug, supra note 52, at 
662. See also infra notes 142 & 153 and accompanying text. 
 55. Of course, it is plausible that easier convictions may not be the socially most valuable ones to 
pursue. 
 56. See Cavanagh, supra note 54, at 807; Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from 
Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 535–36 (1997) (noting that “[t]he costs of defense 
imposed pressure on defendants to settle even weak cases, pressure that was aggravated by the 
financial incentives created by the third party payment structure of insurance and indemnification”). 
See also Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 55, 57 (1991).  
 57. See Cohen & Rubin, supra note 53, at 169; Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and 
Contractarian Paradigms in the Uneasy Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 169 (1996) (emphasizing that enforcement officials have job-advancement 
incentives to thoroughly enforce infractions, but not mentioning monetary gain for SEC); A.C. 
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities 
Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 959–62; 1017–18 (2001) (discussing incentives of private 
litigants and the SEC) [hereinafter Pritchard]. 
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legislation than more frivolous litigation via increases in corporate civil 
liability.58
C. Influencing the Enforcers 
Another reason why the identity of the enforcer is important is that 
government enforcers operate within a budget that is subject to 
congressional control.59 In light of this, corporate interests can influence 
the enforcement of criminal laws—by lobbying over enforcement 
budgets—in a manner they cannot for civil liability as enforced by private 
litigants.60 For example, corporate interests could lobby for a lower 
enforcement budget and thereby reduce the frequency of enforcement.61 
Furthermore, there is a rich literature discussing how corporate interests 
may be able to “capture” agencies and their enforcement.62 Finally, 
lobbying over enforcement budgets is somewhat less visible than direct 
lobbying over legislation. Thus, corporate interests would prefer 
government enforcement of the law, as that still leaves these interests with 
more influence in the enforcement process.  
Of course, government enforcement can occur in two ways: criminal or 
civil. Corporate interests are more likely to prefer corporate criminal 
 58. There is considerable evidence from the antitrust and securities laws fields that business 
interests often prefer government enforcement to private litigation. See Antitrust Advance, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jun 17, 1976, at 34; Susan Antilla, A Battle Over Securities-Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1993, at 
F13; Jeff Gerth, Overhaul of Securities Laws: A Fast Track to Change or a Hasty Decision?, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 26, 1995, at A19; Neil A. Lewis, House Passes Bill That Would Limit Suits of Investors, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1995, at A1; Bruce Rubenstein, Cease and Desist, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 
1994, at 1.  
 59. See Ronald E. Bornstein & N. Elaine Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trading, 
1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 375, 387 (1987) (noting that “[t]he Senate Banking Committee also has 
held several hearings regarding the problem of insider trading in the context of corporate mergers and 
takeovers. In the course of those hearings, recommendations were made to clarify the offense of 
insider trading and to increase the portion of the SEC’s budget allocated to related enforcement 
activities”); William J. Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 863, 
897 (1987) (noting that individuals can lobby Congress to sustain the SEC’s enforcement budget).  
 60. See Delegation, supra note 33, at 789–810; Christopher Drew, In the Productivity Push, How 
Much Is Too Much?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1995, at C1. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without 
Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 289 
(1988) (indicating that when legislators give power to regulatory agencies, those agencies become the 
focus of competing interests).  
 61. See Delegation, supra note 33, at 776–79; Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with 
the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1365 n.380 (1998) (indicating that UPS 
lobbied to decrease the OSHA’s budget and that corporations direct some efforts to “lobby to reduce 
penalties for violations and to reduce funds for enforcement of existing law”).  
 62. See S.M. PHILLIPS & J.R. ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 21–24 (1981); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case 
Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (1994). 
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enforcement because of its infrequency compared to civil enforcement.63 
Further, corporate crime legislation leads to the creation of fewer 
actionable wrongs than increases in corporate civil liability.64 This is yet 
another reason why corporate interests may prefer the criminal route.65
D. Procedural Protections 
As a general matter, corporate criminal liability requires the moving 
party to meet more procedural hurdles than corporate civil liability (e.g., 
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, and the bar on double 
jeopardy).66 In civil cases the moving party (even the government) must 
prove liability only by preponderance of the evidence and is subject to 
 63. See supra Part III.A. In theory, corporations could lobby to have exclusively government 
civil enforcement (i.e., prohibit private litigation) rather than corporate crime legislation. This seems 
unlikely as a political matter. See Adam F. Ingber, Note, 10b-5 or not 10b-5? Are the Current Efforts 
to Reform Securities Litigation Misguided?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 5351, 5353–55 (1993) (stating that 
private enforcement of the 1934 Securities laws is “essential for efficient markets”); Pritchard, supra 
note 57, at 1017 n.397; Joel Seligman, The SEC’s Unfinished Soft Information Revolution, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1953, 1988 (1995) (noting that “[g]iven the limited Commission [SEC] resources 
available for the enforcement of its mandatory disclosure system, private litigation has been 
recognized as performing a useful augmentative deterrent, as well as compensatory, role”); Jeffrey P. 
Strickler, Comment, Inside Information and Outside Traders: Corporate Recovery of the Outsider’s 
Unfair Gain, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 483, 508 (1985) (advocating use of private enforcement in securities 
law often because “government enforcement agencies are overburdened and cannot adequately police 
the market”).  
 Moreover, the U.S. tradition is to extend some private rights of action (even implicitly) when there 
is an expansion of civil liability. See, e.g., Virginia G. Maurer, Antitrust and RICO: Standing on the 
Slippery Slope, 25 GA. L. REV. 711 (1991) (noting that “[s]ince 1890, federal statutes have provided a 
private civil damages action to augment public enforcement of antitrust laws”). In addition, the desire 
for compensation and a distrust of government combine to make excluding private enforcement a 
fairly infrequent event. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities 
Frauds, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 652 (1996) (noting that “the conventional view that private litigation is 
a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement is well-grounded”). However, recent measures in the 
securities regulation arena, such as Regulation F-D, appear to rely more exclusively on government 
enforcement. See COX, supra note 39, at 976–82. 
 64. Criminalizing civil wrongs does not create new grounds of recovery for private litigants.  
 65. One might view Sarbanes-Oxley as an example of this. Note also that the analysis in the text 
suggests that private interests (litigants and their attorneys) favor increases in corporate civil liability 
over corporate crime legislation. Thus, one expects that private interest support for corporate crime 
legislation would be weaker than support for increases in corporate civil liability, which increases 
profits directly for plaintiffs. See Toobin, supra note 33, at 94 (quoting Joseph Grundfest as saying, 
“[t]he last thing that Bill Lerach wants is a bigger budget for the SEC and more lawsuits to sue the 
people that he’s suing . . . If the SEC had the resources to go after the problem in a big way, there is a 
great deal of evidence that suggests they would do a better job with the companies that have really 
committed fraud, and not pursue cases where the evidence is weaker.”).  
 66. See generally Developments, supra note 11, at 1341–50. See also FRANK & LYNCH, supra 
note 42, at 26–28 (noting the difficulty of proving intent, standard of proof, and procedural rights); 
Alexander Kovel, A Case for Civil Penalties: Air Pollution Control, 46 J. URB. L. 153, 159 (1969).  
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lesser procedural restrictions than in the criminal process.67 To the extent 
that these criminal procedures impede convictions, corporate interests 
prefer criminal liability over corporate civil liability, for which judgments 
are easier to obtain.68  
E. Supra-Compensatory Damages 
Corporate civil liability—when enforced by private litigants—involves 
the real risk of supra-compensatory damages (e.g., treble or punitive 
damages).69 The areas in which the government can claim such large 
sanctions are more limited.70 Consequently, corporate interests may prefer 
governmental enforcement because it is likely to lead to lesser sanctions 
than private litigant enforcement.71  
 67. On the higher standard of proof, see Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 6, at 
1512–17. On corporate procedural protections, see Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should Corporations 
Receive the Protections of Criminal Procedure?, Draft Paper 2004 (on file with author). On the 
importance of budgetary allocation for prosecution, see Delegation, supra note 33, at 789–810. There 
is evidence that in some spheres enforcement budgets have increased somewhat. See Neumayr, supra 
note 45, at 5–6 (discussing environmental enforcement).  
 68. The importance of these procedural safeguards is diminished when there is a great deal of 
criminalization because the increasing amount of potential criminal liability makes it easier for 
prosecutors to obtain convictions in spite of the procedural safeguards. See Stuntz, supra note 37, at 
537–38. This is due to the greater breadth of the law and greater threat value of trials when 
criminalization is rampant. See id. 
 69. See Orland, supra note 43, at 16. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (1982) (treble damages 
available under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)); Charles A. Sullivan, 
Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the Private Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 14 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 17, 18–25 (1983) (development of treble damages in antitrust actions). 
 70. For further anecdotal support, consider the infamous Exxon Valdez case. In that case one 
suspects that many more people were aware of the civil punitive damages award than the criminal 
penalties. Although Exxon received a $150 million fine as per a criminal plea agreement, the court 
forgave $125 million of it in recognition of Exxon’s cooperation in cleaning up the spill and paying 
certain private claims. See Consent Decree and Agreement at 18–19, Clerk’s Docket No. 46 in United 
States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-0082-CV, and Clerk’s Docket No. 26 in Alaska v. Exxon Corp., No. 
A91-0083-CV. In contrast, as part of its civil settlement, Exxon agreed to pay $900 million in addition 
to the $2.1 billion it had already spent on the clean-up. Id. The settlement also contains a “reopener 
window” between September 1, 2002 and September 1, 2006, during which the states may make a 
claim for up to an additional $100 million. Id. In addition, Exxon remained subject to civil suits by 
private parties which resulted in a $5 billion punitive jury award (the largest punitive judgment ever 
suffered by a U.S. corporation). See Spillionaires, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 17, 1996, at B3, 
available at http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV402.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). Also, even after 
the guidelines, the criminal fine is still only a small portion of the total loss the corporation suffers 
from wrongdoing. See Alexander et al., supra note 41, at 409–10; Karpoff & Lott, supra note 44, at 
758 (noting that “[r]eputational cost . . . constitutes most of the cost incurred by firms accused or 
convicted of fraud.”). 
 71. The preferred form of government enforcement may well be criminal because that reduces 
the scope for private litigant recovery as argued in Part C, supra. 
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F. Third Party Liability 
In civil proceedings the corporation is not the only party who may be 
pursued. For example, in a standard securities law civil suit the defendants 
could be the corporation, its officers and directors, its accountants, its 
attorneys, and its underwriters.72 Although we can pursue third parties in 
criminal cases, it is more difficult to impose liability on them (often due in 
part to mens rea requirements).73 This may be valuable to corporations 
because they often bear a large portion of the costs associated with third 
party liability.74 For example, if third parties contract with the corporation 
in some form (e.g., to provide accountancy services), then the increased 
risk of bearing sanctions for third parties would probably be reflected in 
higher prices (e.g., higher accounting fees) charged to the corporation.75 If 
the expected cost to third parties is less under criminal regimes than under 
civil liability, then we might expect corporate interests to prefer the lower-
cost criminal alternative.  
G. Substitution Thesis Examples 
For the reasons identified above we might expect corporate interests to 
prefer corporate crime legislation over enhancements in corporate civil 
liability when some congressional response is inevitable. If so, do we see 
instances of this? I would argue that there is evidence which, although not 
conclusive, is supportive of the substitution thesis.76  
 72. See, e.g., CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 43, at 89–91 (liability for accountants); 
George D. Reycraft, Conflicts and Complications: Conflicts of Interest and Effective Representation: 
The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 607 (1988) (noting that “[a] fourth factor 
that cannot be overlooked is that the lawyer or law firm usually maintains a sizable malpractice 
insurance policy. Thus lawyers, like accountants and underwriters, are often seen as ‘deep pockets’ 
and a ready source of settlement or award money.”). 
 73. Cf. Developments, supra note 11, at 1259–75. But see Neumayr, supra note 45, at 10 
(arguing that negligence standards are increasing). 
 74. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 74–78 (1986).
 75. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and 
Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241 
(1993) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell] (noting that “[w]hen employees face the risk of fines, they 
naturally will demand higher compensation from firms, everything else being equal. In effect, this will 
cause firms to pay fines in the form of higher wages”); Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for 
Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
221, 239 (1995) (noting that an increase in liability for attorneys for failure to disclose their clients’ 
illegal practices will result in risk premiums charged by whistleblowers). 
 76. An explanatory note is perhaps in order. I do not expect that there will be direct documentary 
evidence indicating that corporate interests ignored or supported corporate crime legislation in order to 
avoid increases in corporate civil liability. Such “smoking gun” memos would be truly useful, but, 
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Let us begin with the most recent series of corporate scandals involving 
accounting misrepresentations and securities fraud. One response could 
have been to repeal the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA) and overturn some related U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.77 
This is because the PSLRA restricted the scope of private securities fraud 
liability and, along with some U.S. Supreme Court precedent, made it 
harder to impose liability on associated parties (e.g., accountants).78 This 
in turn insulated accountants and issuers to some extent from securities 
fraud liability, thereby reducing the costs associated with securities fraud 
(for them) and, arguably, increasing the incentive to engage in it.79 
Repealing the PSLRA and overturning associated U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent might combat this and would operate as an increase in corporate 
civil liability because it would open up corporations and accountants to 
greater liability. 
Indeed, after the Enron scandal some people essentially did lobby for 
this.80 However, these initiatives were unsuccessful and instead Congress 
enacted Sarbanes-Oxley which, amongst other things, ratchets-up criminal 
penalties.81 Moreover, we saw little corporate opposition to Sarbanes-
given the likely sophistication of most corporate interests, unlikely to be found. Rather, I provide 
examples of where, when some kind of congressional response was inevitable, corporate interests 
appeared to lobby most strongly against increases in corporate civil liability and said little if anything 
against increases in corporate crime legislation. Although this evidence is not as compelling as a 
“smoking gun” memo, the pattern created over time does provide an indication as to the lobbying 
activities and preferences of corporate interests.  
 77. See Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in various sections of 15 
U.S.C.); Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).  
 78. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1409–12 (2002) [hereinafter Coffee].  
 79. See Coffee, supra note 78, at 1409–12. There are other explanations for the recent spate of 
fraud. See id. at 1412–13 (discussing an “irrational market”), 1413–16 (discussing other explanatory 
matters).  
 80. See Interview with Professor John Coffee, Adolf E. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law 
School (Feb. 28, 2003); ADAM C. PRITCHARD, SHOULD CONGRESS REPEAL SECURITIES CLASS 
ACTION REFORM?, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 471, at 12–14 (Feb. 27, 2003), at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-471es.html.  
 81. See generally Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107–
204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A and 18 U.S.C.A.). See 
SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3. The new law essentially creates fewer private claims 
(than might repeal of the PSLRA). 
 Besides corporate crime legislation, there are other areas where corporations may rely on some 
kind of substitution thesis. For example, it has been argued that Delaware corporate law may develop 
and respond to threats (tacit and explicit) to federalize corporate law. See Mark Roe, Delaware’s 
Competition (Draft Paper 2003, on file with author). Thus, certain measures may be undertaken in 
Delaware not because they are perceived to be the most efficient, but because if they are not adopted, 
then an even worse outcome may eventuate: federalization of the issue at hand. See Roe, Delaware’s 
Competition, supra. This suggests that changes in state corporate law are acting as substitutes for more 
costly changes in federal law. 
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Oxley compared to the opposition to moves to enhance corporate civil 
liability via repeal of the PSLRA.82
This pattern, however, is not unique to Sarbanes-Oxley. If we examine 
lobbying around the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act we also notice that 
criminal liability generates little concern.83 Indeed, there appeared to be 
more corporate opposition to proposals to require disclosure of payments 
made to foreign government officials.84 These disclosure requirements 
would have imposed a large burden on both corporations (to comply with 
the requirement) and on the government (to enforce it).85 In the end, the 
disclosure requirements did not come to pass and instead we saw an 
increase in criminal liability.86 By all accounts the costs of this criminal 
liability for business interests are quite small.87 One might interpret these 
events as suggesting that corporate interests preferred criminalization 
because it imposed lower costs than disclosure requirements.88  
 There is also some evidence suggesting that the judiciary may rely on substitution too. Some 
empirical evidence suggests that federal judges have started awarding higher sanctions since the 
Sentencing Guidelines were adopted even in cases not subject to the Guidelines. See Alexander, et al., 
supra note 41, at 416–17. The conjecture is that this may have been a strategic move by the judiciary 
to head off any more sanction increases or encroachments on sentencing discretion for the time being. 
See id. 
 82. See Pritchard, supra note 57, at 2 (noting vigorous opposition exists to the PSLRA but giving 
no such information on Sarbanes-Oxley).  
 83. See Morton Mintz, Hill Considers Changing Law on Foreign Bribery, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 
1987, at H6 [hereinafter Mintz]; S. REP. NO. 95–114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.A.A.N. 
4098, 4107–08.  
 84. See S. REP. NO. 95–114, supra note 83. 
 85. See id.  
 86. See id. 
 87. See Mintz, supra note 83, at H6. 
 88. Corporate interests have also been known to oppose increased enforcement by private 
litigants while being less opposed to increased government enforcement. This is consistent with the 
notion, discussed earlier, that corporate interests may prefer government enforcement because it is 
more targeted and more subject to their control. For example, in the 1970s there were attempts to 
permit state attorneys general to bring antitrust suits on behalf of their citizens and then permit follow-
on private enforcement. See Antitrust Advance, N.Y. TIMES, Jun 17, 1976, at 34; Eileen Shanahan, 
Antitrust Bill Stopped By A Business Lobby, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1975, at 1. Corporate interests (led 
by the Business Roundtable) lobbied heavily against this. See Antitrust Advance, supra; Shanahan, 
supra. In the end, the version of the law that was enacted was one that did permit state attorneys 
general to bring suit on behalf of their citizens, but limited the ability of private attorneys to capture 
treble damages as well as making it more difficult to garner contingency fees. See Antitrust Advance, 
supra. Another similar instance is corporate lobbying activities surrounding the availability of treble 
damages in anti-racketeering cases. Corporations lobbied heavily against the treble damages portions, 
but not too much against the criminal aspects. See Russell Mokhiber, Triple Damages, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 14, 1985, at 23. This is consistent with the notion that corporate interests prefer government 
enforcement to private litigant enforcement and similarly may prefer corporate crime legislation over 
increases in corporate civil liability. 
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This is not to suggest that corporate interests never lobby in the 
criminal sphere but that such lobbying tends to be the exception rather 
than the rule. Moreover, there is evidence that corporate interests only 
lobby in the criminal sphere when there are large penalty increases being 
proposed or when criminal liability for directors and officers is likely to 
increase significantly.89 These are instances where the costs of corporate 
crime legislation are getting larger and closer to the costs of increases in 
corporate civil liability; thus, the lobbying activity is more understandable.  
IV. THE SUBSTITUTION THESIS WHEN THE CONCERN IS MANAGERIAL 
LIABILITY 
Corporate interests may also prefer corporate crime legislation because 
of its potential effect on the incidence of managerial criminal liability. 
This is because corporate criminal liability has the potential to deflect 
criminal liability away from managers and on to the corporation (i.e., 
shareholders).  
For example, having a corporate defendant along with a management 
defendant in the same case may increase the odds that management 
escapes conviction or suffers a lesser criminal penalty relative to where 
management is the only defendant.90 When there are two sets of 
 89. For example, when the organizational sentencing guidelines increased corporate criminal 
penalties, we saw corporate interests lobby heavily for smaller increases in penalties and for sanction 
reductions based on compliance efforts. These efforts were largely successful. See Reynolds, supra 
note 40, at 27; Macey, supra note 47, at 316–17. Also, when criminal liability for officers and 
directors may increase, we see corporate lobbying efforts that often defeat or restrain attempts to 
expand this liability. Examples would be proposals to increase such liability at the time of the passage 
of the federal securities laws. See Attacks Securities Bill; Investment Bankers’ Head Calls It Detriment 
to Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1933, at 29 [hereinafter Attacks]; G.R. Davis, The Securities Bill; 
Some Features Viewed as In Restraint of Trade, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1933, at 14 [hereinafter Davis]; 
Merchants Protest; New Yorkers Ask for Hearing on the Securities Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1933, at 3 
[hereinafter Merchants Protest]; Senators Revise Securities Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1933, at N9 
[hereinafter Senators]; Eustace Seligman, Securities Bill Held Too Strict, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1933, at 
23 [hereinafter Seligman]; The Securities Bill Made Less Drastic; Conferees Ease Responsibility on 
Directors, Bar “Censorship” in Advertising; N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1933, at 25 [hereinafter Securities 
Bill]. 
 90. See BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 3.09, at 115–18 (discussing case law upholding corporate 
convictions when individual agents were not convicted); John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn, No 
Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. 
REV. 386, 397–402 (1981) [hereinafter Coffee, Unscandalized Inquiry]; Jeffrey S. Parker & Raymond 
A. Atkins, Did the Corporate Criminal Sentencing Guidelines Matter? Some Preliminary Empirical 
Observations, 42 J.L. & ECON. 423, 441–43 (1999) [hereinafter Parker & Atkins]; Jeffrey S. Parker, 
Doctrine for Destruction: The Case of Corporate Criminal Liability, 17 MANAGERIAL & DEC. ECON. 
381 (1996); Parker, supra note 7, at 399–400. The idea here is that the presence of corporate crime 
legislation reduces the cost of managerial criminal liability and makes it more acceptable (to managers 
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defendants (corporation and manager) we provide the decision maker (the 
judge or jury) with more options of who to hold accountable.91 The 
decision maker may then decide to exercise this choice in favor of 
acquitting managers and convicting corporations.92 This may be because 
the decision maker sympathizes with a managerial defendant (a real 
human being who has a family and can go to jail) more than with a 
corporate defendant which, of course, cannot go to jail.93 Simply put, it 
provides the decision maker with a method of holding someone (the 
corporation) accountable for the wrongdoing without sending a real human 
to jail.94 This option is not present when there is only one defendant. The 
choice there is to hold the manager accountable or no one at all. It is then 
plausible that fewer managers are being convicted when corporate 
criminal liability is available than when it is not. Does such liability 
deflection happen? If so, why would corporations not lobby against this? 
There is anecdotal and empirical evidence suggesting that corporate 
criminal liability results in corporations bearing some of the blame that 
would otherwise be visited upon management. For example, there is case 
law discussing whether a corporate conviction can stand when all 
potentially liable agents have been acquitted.95 The answer, perhaps 
and corporations) to enact. Managers are less opposed to this because they expect that there will be 
some insulation/deflection from liability. 
 91. See Coffee, Unscandalized Inquiry, supra note 90, at 397–402; Parker & Atkins, supra note 
90, at 442–43 (providing some evidence that the presence of individual codefendants impacts the 
penalties imposed). 
 92. See BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 3.09, at 115–18.  
 93. See id.  
 94. Prosecutors and Congress would also like this result as the overall rate of conviction may 
rise, and convictions are important to prosecutors. See Glaeser et al., supra note 52, at 262–66 
(discussing private career benefits from successful prosecutions); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary 
Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 442 (1992) [hereinafter Van 
Kessel] (noting that “win-loss records can become an important mark of performance”); Hylton & 
Khanna, supra note 8, at 18–25; Stuntz, supra note 37, at 534. One may wonder if prosecutors would 
prefer to obtain a conviction of a real human being. Might that not be worth more than the conviction 
of a corporation? This is possible, but it depends on what prosecutors are trying to do. If obtaining 
convictions against management is more difficult than obtaining convictions against corporations, then 
prosecutors might not prefer to substitute a high-risk strategy (going after management) at the expense 
of getting a more certain conviction of a corporation. The fact that prosecutors do bring charges 
against both the corporation and the individuals (when deflection is a concern) suggests perhaps that 
prosecutors are willing to take the risk of trading off reduced convictions against individuals for an 
overall higher rate of conviction.  
 95. See BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 3.09, at 115–18 (discussing case law upholding corporate 
convictions when individual agents were not convicted); GRUNER, supra note 4, § 3.7.4, at 254–58 
(same); Ann Foerschler, Comment, Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward a Better Understanding of 
Corporate Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1290 (1990) (stating that “In a number of cases in 
which both were jointly tried for an offense, the jury convicted the corporate defendant and acquitted 
the individual defendants.”).  
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surprisingly, is that the corporate conviction can stand.96 Although the 
legal rationales for this result are interesting,97 the important point for my 
analysis is that these cases arise in the first place. This implies that in some 
instances corporations are being held liable and managers acquitted. One 
conjectures that this is because juries may empathize more with human 
defendants than fictional ones. Alternative explanations are plausible too, 
but the presence of these cases raises the specter that managers were 
acquitted because, at least in part, the decision maker had an alternative 
defendant to hold liable—namely, the corporation (i.e., shareholders).98  
There are also indications that the deflection account is a concern 
recognized by prosecutors. The Department of Justice’s PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS states that 
“prosecutor[s] should be wary of attempts to shield corporate officers and 
employees from liability by a willingness of the corporation to plead 
guilty.”99 This concern may be one factor that has led prosecutors to 
reduce sanctions on (or not charge) corporations when they turn over 
information about potentially culpable agents.100  
Moreover, there is some empirical evidence which is at least not 
inconsistent with a deflection thesis.101 The evidence suggests that 
corporate and individual penalties are at least implicitly coordinated.102 If 
such coordination does occur, that suggests that individual penalties 
 96. See supra note 95. 
 97. See  supra note 95. 
 98. See supra note 95. See also Developments, supra note 11, at 1367–68 (highlighting the 
perception that corporations often are convicted while managers are acquitted). One might also view 
these outcomes as compromise verdicts. 
 99. LARRY D. THOMPSON, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM ON PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, Jan. 20, 2003 [hereinafter PRINCIPLES], Part 
VI, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm. If these guidelines had their 
desired impact, then the deflection potential would be reduced and may reduce some support for 
corporate crime legislation by corporations and managers on this front. 
 100. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8C2.5(g)(1) (2002) (stating that fines and/or sentences 
may be reduced for cooperation with the government), available at http://www.ussc.gov 
/2002guid/8c2_5.htm. (last visited Apr. 1, 2004); see also Win Swenson, Deputy General 
Counsel/Legislative Counsel, The Organizational Guidelines’ “Carrot and Stick” Philosophy, and 
Their Focus on Effective Compliance, at http://www.ussc.gov/SYMPO/WCSYMPO1.HTM (the 
Deputy Director of USSG clarifies § 8C2.5(g)(1): “[v]oluntary disclosure and cooperation by a 
company mean, for example, that harms caused by the company will be rectified and individuals 
within the company will be identified and held accountable.”) (emphasis in original); Laufer, supra 
note 6, at 648–52. 
 101. See Parker & Atkins, supra note 90, at 441–43. 
 102. See id. at 443. Direct data on the effects of a corporate co-defendant on the other defendants 
in corporate crime cases appears unavailable due to data constraints at the US Sentencing Commission. 
Id. at 430. 
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should drop with the presence of corporate co-defendants.103 Thus, it is 
plausible that when management is the sole defendant, the likelihood and 
magnitude of managerial criminal sanctions are higher than the likelihood 
and magnitude of managerial criminal sanctions when there is another 
defendant (such as the corporation).104 In other words, the deflection 
concern appears real.105
 103. See id. at 443. The evidence of coordinated penalties is consistent with individual penalties 
declining with the addition of a corporate co-defendant and also with corporate penalties declining 
with the addition of an individual co-defendant. This raises an interesting “chicken and egg” problem. 
Do we assume that the former account (individual defendant later joined by corporate defendant) or 
latter account (corporate defendant later joined by individual defendant) is the correct picture? If the 
former, then the deflection account in the text is at issue; if the latter, then a different kind of deflection 
account is offered—the corporation is avoiding criminal sanctions by shifting some of them to the 
individual. Both are plausible: the former account because it is the kind of deflection a corporation and 
management would both support (as it might reduce risk-bearing costs and hence wage bills—see 
discussion infra text accompanying notes 109–24). The latter is consistent with a reverse 
whistleblowing hypothesis where the corporation turns over employees (regardless of whether the 
employee “ratted out” was actually culpable or simply a scapegoat). See infra text accompanying notes 
109–24. My goal is not to choose between these accounts because both are plausible; rather, my aim is 
to suggest that the deflection account is plausible. 
 104. See Parker & Atkins, supra note 90, at 442–43.  
 105. One may wonder about the significance of the deflection account given that the number of 
criminal prosecutions in the business sphere is rather small. See SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL 
REPORT 2001, supra note 41; Alexander et al., supra note 41, at 403; First, supra note 41, at 3–5; 
Geraghty, supra note 41, at 338; Murphy, supra note 41, at 113; Rakoff, supra note 41, at 2; Davidson, 
supra note 41, at B3. To be clear, I am not suggesting that deflection is the cause of corporate crime 
legislation or enforcement—only that it may be another factor that softens the cost of corporate crime 
legislation for business interests when confronted with a Congress that is going to enact something.  
 On a separate note, over the last 30 years the rate of civil suits brought by government agencies 
has been increasing while criminal suits have stayed nearly constant. See Hughes, supra note 25, at 
579–80; 587–89; Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and 
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1798 (1992). The reasons for this are fairly simple: corporate civil 
liability offers the same penalties as and similar or better enforcement tools than corporate criminal 
liability, but at a lower standard of proof. This raises interesting questions about why prosecutors bring 
corporate criminal cases at all.  
 One explanation is that prosecutors consider certain cases particularly egregious and hence decide 
to pursue them criminally. However, if one casually looks at many corporate criminal prosecutions, it 
is not at all clear that the underlying behavior is all that egregious—sometimes it is and sometimes not. 
See Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 6, at 1532. The evidence on corporate crime 
prosecutions at the federal level suggests that most prosecutions are against small distressed 
corporations which are rarely involved in very harmful wrongdoing and might be considerably easier 
convictions than targeting larger and more well-funded (and -defended) publicly traded corporations. 
See SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2001, supra note 41; First, supra note 41, at 4–8; 
Davidson, supra note 41, at B3; Geraghty, supra note 41, at 338; Murphy, supra note 41, at 113; 
Rakoff, supra note 41, at 2.  
 Other explanations also abound, such as that prosecutors are actually interested in these cases 
(e.g., they are interested in acquiring human capital in this field). See Glaeser et al., supra note 52, at 
261; Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, The Sources of Agency: An Empirical Examination of 
United States Attorneys 25–27 (Draft paper 1999, on file with author) [hereinafter Boylan & Long]. 
Although plausible, one expects that there are some constraints on how easily prosecutors can choose 
cases to simply pad their resumes. See Delegation, supra note 33, at 789–810 (suggesting some 
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Of course, I do not expect that deflection will occur all the time. For 
example, if managers are clearly guilty of wrongdoing and have caused 
serious harm, deflection is less likely to occur.106 Juries are likely to place 
more blame squarely on management’s shoulders in such cases.107 
Nonetheless, it is both plausible and likely that deflection occurs in a 
number of other instances.  
If corporations sometimes bear the blame for management behavior 
because of corporate criminal liability then why might corporations not 
actively lobby against such liability? There are a couple of potential 
explanations for this: (1) this “scapegoating” does not hurt the corporation 
and (2) corporations are hurt but are stymied by agency costs.108 Let us 
examine each one in turn. 
Corporate criminal liability could arguably benefit corporations by 
shifting criminal liability from managers, who are poor risk-bearers, to 
corporations, who are better risk-bearers.109 Managers are considered poor 
risk-bearers because they cannot diversify their investment in the 
corporation (largely human capital, which is allocated to a single firm) as 
easily as shareholders can diversify their investment in the corporation 
(largely monetary capital, which can be reallocated to multiple firms).110 
Consequently, managers need to be compensated more than shareholders 
for bearing risk (i.e., a risk premium reflected in a higher wage), which 
may lead corporations (i.e., shareholders) to prefer to bear the risk 
themselves to reduce their wage bills.111 Corporations could do this in civil 
constraints on prosecutors through, for example, budgetary allocation). It is not clear that any of these 
motivations would correlate with bringing criminal prosecutions against corporations when it is in the 
public interest (if ever). 
 106. One presumes juries would be less sympathetic in such a case than when managers are not 
clearly culpable and where the harm appears to be small. Cf. BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 3.09, at 115–
18. 
 107. Further, when the corporation is the victim of the wrongdoing (e.g., embezzlement), 
deflection is less likely to occur because juries may not wish to convict the victim (i.e., the 
corporation). Corporations may presumably also be more likely to turn over an agent to authorities in 
such a situation. 
 108. Of course, if the costs of this “scapegoating” are small, then it may not pay for corporations 
to spend resources to oppose it. Cf. generally Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory 
of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 326 (1995) [hereinafter Arlen & Weiss].  
 109. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 
YALE L.J. 857, 864–67 (1984) [hereinafter Kraakman]. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 75, at 241. The recent increases in penalties under 
Sarbanes-Oxley appear to have led to increases in directors’ and officers’ insurance and to increases in 
compensation packages for independent directors. See Richard A. Epstein, Sarbanes Overdose Law 
and Economics, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A17. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus 
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (1986) (noting that 
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liability regimes by paying for insurance or indemnification of corporate 
agents, thereby shifting the risk of liability to themselves.112
The risk of criminal sanctions is just another risk that managers bear 
poorly and a risk for which they need to be, at least implicitly, 
compensated through something like a higher wage.113 Thus, corporations 
may prefer to reduce their wage bills by shifting some criminal liability 
away from managers, but criminal sanctions on managers (especially jail) 
are often difficult to indemnify explicitly or insure against.114 This is 
where corporate criminal liability might be desirable to corporations: it 
permits them to shift some liability away from management (and onto 
themselves), thereby reducing their wage bill.115  
To elaborate, let us consider the following example. Assume that 
managers face a criminal fine of $100 for some wrongdoing with a 20% 
probability when there is no corporate criminal liability.116 This means 
they face an expected sanction of $20 and also have risk-bearing costs 
associated with facing the risk of criminal penalties. Let us say these risk-
bearing costs amount to an additional $8 (i.e., for every $5 in expected 
liability, a $2 risk-bearing cost). This implies that the cost to managers is 
$28, and this would, in some measure, be reflected in the wages paid to 
them.117 This higher wage would be borne by the corporation, and in this 
sense, the corporation bears the costs of managerial criminal liability.118  
Now consider the alternative of where both corporations and managers 
can be held criminally liable. In such a scenario assume that the 
corporation bears the $100 criminal fine 15% of the time, and managers 
bear it only 5% of the time (due to liability deflection to corporations). 
Here the cost to the corporation is the 15% of the time it is held liable and 
corporations end up paying, in the form of higher compensation, for the costs associated with the risk 
of liability that managers bear). 
 112. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER H. KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE 
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 242, 243–48, 254–55 (2003) (discussing indemnification and 
insurance in the context of breaches of fiduciary duty).  
 113. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 75, at 241. Also, to the extent that some of the loss 
suffered by management is in the form of stigma it would be difficult to insure against. 
 114. See 2 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS & 
DIRECTORS 446 (6th ed. 1998) [hereinafter KNEPPER & BAILEY]. 
 115. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 75, at 241. This aspect of corporate criminal liability 
would be even more desirable to corporations if they thought there was over-criminalization of what, 
in their view, is profit enhancing behavior. For the notion that there is over-criminalization, see, e.g., 
Coffee, Reflections, supra note 4, at 210–13; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of 
Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 470 (1997) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley]. 
 116. For now I assume this is for some mix of their intentional and unintentional wrongdoing. 
 117. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 75, at 241. 
 118. See id. 
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the wage increase to management to reflect the 5% risk of criminal 
liability.119 The expected sanctions are then $15 on the corporation and $5 
on managers. We are then left with risk-bearing costs. The corporation is 
normally assumed to be risk-neutral because shareholders can diversify 
their investment in the corporation, and this suggests they bear little 
additional cost above the $15 expected sanction.120 Managers, on the other 
hand, bear risk poorly and would face some risk-bearing costs.121 
However, managers bear a lesser risk of criminal penalties here than when 
there is no corporate criminal liability. Thus, their risk-bearing costs 
should be less and I assume for now that these costs are only $2.122 This 
suggests that managers bear costs of $7 ($5 plus $2) and the corporation 
$15 for a total of $22. This is less than the total costs when there is no 
corporate criminal liability ($28 in this hypothetical). Because the 
corporation is paying managerial wages and in effect bearing the cost of 
these liability regimes, it would prefer the lower total cost option.123 In 
other words, here corporations prefer corporate criminal liability.124
Finally, even if deflection leads to greater costs for corporations, they 
may still not lobby against corporate crime legislation because of agency 
 119. Cf. id.  
 120. See id.  
 121. See Kraakman, supra note 109, at 864–67. 
 122. I have assumed that risk-bearing costs decrease linearly. That is, if a $20 expected sanction 
generated risk bearing costs of $8, then a $5 expected sanction should generate a proportionally 
smaller amount of risk-bearing costs. Because $5 is 25% of $20, I have assumed risk-bearing costs are 
25% of $8 or simply $2. This assumption is for simplicity—all that is required is some decrease in 
risk-bearing costs.  
 123. Cf. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 75, at 241. The corporation may even find it in its interest 
to subject itself to an overall greater likelihood of conviction to obtain this risk-shifting. The 
corporation may bear an overall greater likelihood of liability in two ways. First, when there are two 
defendants (corporation and managers), the overall conviction rate is higher. This means that it is 
possible that the corporation could be convicted 20% of the time (instead of 15% as in the text), and 
management could also be convicted 5% of the time—the corporation and associated parties would 
then bear a greater overall likelihood of conviction (25% of the time). Another way in which corporate 
liability could increase is that shifting liability away from managers for intentional wrongdoing creates 
a moral hazard (see infra text accompanying notes 175–78 and accompanying text), which could lead 
to more managerial wrongdoing and hence more frequent instances of harm, which should lead to 
increased suits against corporations. It is possible that these costs might be worth the reduction in 
managerial risk-bearing costs in some instances.  
 It is also noteworthy that corporate criminal liability’s deflection effect cannot be replicated by 
corporate civil liability because a corporation facing only civil liability is not available in the criminal 
proceedings against the manager as an alternative defendant to convict. Also, one could argue that the 
liability-shifting feature of corporate criminal liability could be achieved by permitting insurance or 
indemnification of managerial criminal liability. I doubt this would occur, as insurers (and those who 
might indemnify or oversee indemnification) are unlikely to offer this for intentional or knowing 
wrongdoing (the kind most likely at issue here) due to moral hazard concerns. See infra notes 175–78 
and accompanying text.  
 124. The reasoning here can be used to support the analysis in Part III.F.  
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costs.125 This is because corporations cannot lobby by themselves—it is 
managers and other agents who lobby on behalf of corporations.126 
However, managers have an incentive not to make the corporation lobby 
against corporate criminal liability because the presence of corporate 
criminal liability may benefit managers via deflection of criminal liability, 
which is difficult to fully shift or insure.127 Agency costs may then prevent 
corporations from actively lobbying against corporate criminal liability.128
V. INTERESTS OF OTHER PLAYERS 
Thus far, I have discussed the likely interests of corporate players, but 
there are other important players too, such as the general public, victims of 
crime, Congress, prosecutors, courts, and potential defendants. My 
analysis suggests that their incentives also push towards broader 
criminalization. 
A. General Public and Victims of Corporate Crime 
The general public and victims of corporate crime are important 
because their desire for punishment, especially of the criminal variety, 
factors into the decisions of the primary players.129 However, because the 
general public and victims often may not be familiar with the details of the 
corporate criminal law and may suffer from collective action problems, 
one would not expect them to monitor closely the laws and rules 
promulgated by legislators.130 Nonetheless, one can treat the desires of the 
 125. Cf. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 108, at 341–43.  
 126. Cf. id.  
 127. See id. For the difficulty in insuring such behavior, see KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 114, 
at 446.  
 128. Further support for this can be gleaned from the PRINCIPLES, supra note 99, at 9–10 
(suggesting that prosecutors be “wary” of corporate pleas that work to shield individuals within the 
corporation from criminal liability). 
 In addition to this, there is evidence that corporate interests have lobbied to reduce managerial 
liability in certain instances while leaving corporate criminal liability essentially untouched. For 
example, when the federal securities laws were enacted, the early drafts of the laws had much greater 
liability for directors of corporations, but that was pared back after extensive criticism and lobbying. 
See Seligman, supra note 89, at 23; Attacks, supra note 89, at 29; Davis, supra note 89, at 14; 
Merchants Protest, supra note 89, at 3; Senators, supra note 89, at N9; Securities Bill, supra note 89, 
at 25.  
 129. See Stuntz, supra note 37, at 523–27. 
 130. See id. at 530. For a classic discussion of collective action, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC 
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). See also RUSSELL 
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982). One also would not expect large groups with disaggregated 
constituents to lobby that effectively. See JACK L. WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN 
AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 66 (1991). See also David M. Hart, 
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general public and victims as creating the boundaries within which the 
primary players engage in their behavior.131
B. Congress & Legislators 
Next, let us consider the interests of the primary promulgators of the 
criminal law: Congress and state legislatures. Presumably, legislators 
would like to remain in power or potentially rise to higher office.132 For 
that to happen they need to please their constituents.133 Most voters appear 
to care deeply about crime and criminal legislation but suffer from the 
collective action problems described above.134 Thus, voters tend to focus 
more on the outcomes of the criminal process (i.e., convictions) rather than 
specific rules, and they may pay more attention to the information 
conveyed through intermediaries (e.g., television news shows) than to the 
entrails of the law.135 For example, voters may like to see more 
convictions, which could be achieved by tightening criminal liability rules 
to make it easier to obtain a conviction or increasing sanctions because 
that increases the threat value of trial, thereby making it easier to obtain 
guilty pleas.136 Voters may also like to know that something is being done 
about certain behavior that concerns them.137 The legislature could create 
Business Is Not an Interest Group (And, By the Way, There’s No Such Thing as “Business”): On the 
Study of Companies in American National Politics (Draft Paper 2002, on file with author); David M. 
Hart, Political Representation Among Dominant Firms: Revisiting the “Olsonian Hypothesis” (Oct. 
2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=357540. On lobbying activities 
of corporations, see generally John M. de Figueiredo, Lobbying and Information in Politics, 
Discussion Paper No. 369, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business, Harvard Law School 
2002, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center; John M. de Figueiredo & Rui 
J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and 
Administrative Regulation (Draft Paper 2002, on file with author); John M. de Figueiredo & Emerson 
H. Tiller, The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal 
Communications Commission, (2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=263302; Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo, & James M. Synder, Are Campaign 
Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or “Why Is There 
So Little Money in Politics” (Draft Paper 2002, on file with author). 
 131. See Stuntz, supra note 37, at 530.  
 132. See id. at 529. I do not mean to suggest that legislators do not (or could not) have altruistic or 
public interest ideals—only that an important goal of legislators is to remain or move up in office. This 
is a fairly standard assumption in the public choice literature. See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer, Public 
Choice, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW & ECONOMICS 101–02 (Eric Posner ed., 2000). Also, staying 
in office may be an important way of achieving the public interest or altruistic goals that some 
legislators may possess. 
 133. See Stuntz, supra note 37, at 529. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. at 530. 
 136. See id. at 537. 
 137. See id. at 529.  
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new crimes that may not really change underlying behavior but may give 
voters a sense of security that “something is being done.”138 Professor 
Stuntz provides an example of such a symbolic measure: when Congress 
criminalized “carjacking” even though there were several other criminal 
provisions that already covered it.139  
C. Prosecutors 
The next important institutional player is the prosecutor. In most 
jurisdictions prosecutors are elected, whereas in others they are 
appointed.140 The elected prosecutors are in a similar position to elected 
legislators—for them to keep their jobs and rise to higher office they need 
to satisfy voters.141 This essentially means they need to bring prosecutions 
in the cases the public wants to see prosecuted.142 Appointed prosecutors 
face somewhat similar pressures, depending on what they would like to 
do. If some would like to run for elected office, then clearly they will need 
to bring prosecutions in cases that the general public strongly desires. If 
some would prefer to move to higher appointed office, then they will need 
to do things that provide the “appointers” with a reason to select them for 
that office.143 This may involve a number of things, but it will almost 
 138. See id. at 530. 
 139. See id. at 560. 
 140. See id. at 533.  
 141. See id. See also Glaeser et al., supra note 52, at 262–66. To this point I have spoken only of 
federal prosecutors, who are not generally elected. I include discussion of elected prosecutors because 
the effect of their likely interests on corporate crime legislation is similar to that of non-elected 
prosecutors. 
 142. See Glaeser et al., supra note 52, at 261 (noting that decisions to prosecute are often 
influenced by prosecutors’ interest in running for higher office); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion 
and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. LAW 643, 662 (2002) (noting that police misconduct prosecution 
occurs only in high cases of public visibility); Stuntz, supra note 37, at 533 (noting that “local 
prosecutors are likely to seek to produce the range of outcomes the public desires”). 
 143. See Glaeser et al., supra note 52, at 262–66 (discussing private career benefits from 
successful prosecutions). See also John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities 
Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 561 (2001) [hereinafter Coates] 
(explaining the actions of appointed SEC commissioners); Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 54, at 
71–72 (discussing incentives for Japanese prosecutors and judges and how these incentives, along with 
a tight budget constraint on prosecutors, work to ensure high conviction rates); Van Kessel, supra note 
94, at 442 (noting that “win-loss records can become an important mark of performance”).  
 Prosecutors could be trying to maximize many different things (e.g., sentences, convictions, 
publicity, human capital). See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 289, 301 (1983) (noting that career prospects and reputation may impact the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion); Glaeser et al., supra note 52, at 266–88 (noting that prosecutors are 
motivated at least in part by career growth prospects and providing empirical evidence to that effect); 
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61, 63–64 (1971) (treating 
prosecutor’s utility as being composed of maximizing expected sentence lengths subject to a budget 
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certainly involve bringing prosecutions in most cases that the general 
public desires.144 Further, both kinds of prosecutors would presumably 
have strong desires to win these cases. This is because the public desires 
not simply prosecutions but also convictions, and because prosecutors 
personally benefit from winning suits.145  
At the same time, line prosecutors (not elected or appointed, but rather 
“hired” prosecutors) would like rules that do not tremendously increase 
their own workload yet generate convictions.146 These last two concerns—
to increase convictions for all prosecutors, but not to increase workloads 
for line prosecutors—might seem to run counter to each other, but they 
need not. Prosecutors can obtain both goals if the criminal law applies to a 
wide range of behavior because then prosecutors have great latitude in 
bringing cases the public desires.147 They are also more likely to obtain 
some kind of conviction, as there are so many crimes with which the 
defendant might be charged.148 Further, the breadth of the criminal law 
helps to reduce prosecutorial workloads.149 With many crimes applying to 
essentially the same behavior, the prosecutor could charge all the crimes in 
one trial and thereby increase the expected sanction the defendant faces 
from going to trial.150 This makes going to trial less attractive to the 
defendant and should induce guilty pleas.151 A guilty plea generates less 
work for prosecutors than trials, yet still results in convictions of some 
kind.152 Moreover, even those prosecutors who are interested in entering 
private practice after their stints in the prosecutor’s office would prefer 
broader criminal law, because increased breadth would provide them with 
constraint); Agents, supra note 38, at 754; Boylan & Long, supra note 105, at 25–27 (finding with 
empirical support that Assistant U.S. Attorneys are often motivated by human capital concerns). 
Instead of specifying a prosecutorial utility function, I focus on what might be needed by prosecutors 
to achieve whatever their ends may be. One expects that bringing cases the public desires and 
obtaining convictions would be useful to most motivations prosecutors may have. See William T. 
Pizzi, Understanding Procedural Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal 
Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1338 (1993) (stating that “prosecutorial 
decisions in the United States are ‘susceptible to political influences’”); Stuntz, supra note 37, at 533 
(wishing to keep their jobs, or move up to higher offices, prosecutors’ “incentives [are] to generate the 
level and distribution of prosecutions that the public wants”).  
 144. See Coates, supra note 143, at 561 (noting that “[t]o pass . . . political muster, appointees are 
screened to respond to the political preferences of voters”); Stuntz, supra note 37, at 533–39. 
 145. See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 8, at 18–25; Stuntz, supra note 37, at 534. 
 146. See Stuntz, supra note 37, at 535. 
 147. See id. at 537–38. 
 148. See id. at 537. 
 149. See id.  
 150. See id.  
 151. See id. at 538. 
 152. See id. at 537. 
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more opportunities to develop expertise and human capital and become 
thereby more valuable in their future private practice.153 Consequently, if 
prosecutors were to lobby legislators, we would expect them to want 
broader criminalization because that increases the flexibility of 
prosecutors’ response to public desires, makes it easier to obtain some 
kind of conviction, helps to build human capital, and makes it easier to 
obtain guilty pleas (thereby reducing workloads).154  
Of course, broader criminal law provisions may result in 
criminalization of innocuous behavior and in a negative reaction by the 
polity (e.g., Prohibition).155 However, this concern is muted in the 
American criminal justice system by prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors 
need not prosecute every case that presents a potential violation of the 
criminal law.156 Further, given the desire of most prosecutors to bring suits 
that the public desires, we might expect that few prosecutions would 
deeply offend public sensibilities.157  
Furthermore, this also suggests that Congress is insulated in some 
respects from the costs of over-criminalizing behavior because prosecutors 
will rarely bring unpopular cases.158 When they do, the general public is 
more likely to lay blame at the feet of the prosecutor.159 Consequently, one 
would expect that Congress would prefer to err on the side of over-
criminalizing (which has little cost given prosecutorial discretion) rather 
 153. On prosecutors’ incentives to enter private practice, see generally Glaeser et al., supra note 
52, at 266–88 (noting that prosecutors are motivated at least in part by career growth prospects, and 
providing empirical evidence to that effect); Boylan & Long, supra note 105, at 25–27 (finding with 
empirical support that Assistant U.S. Attorneys are often motivated by human capital concerns). 
 154. See Stuntz, supra note 37, at 537–38. The investigatory agencies (e.g., the FBI) may have 
interests that push in the same direction as line prosecutors. More criminalization increases the 
investigatory agencies’ ability to conduct their investigations and may help reduce the work they need 
to do to gather evidence. Cf. Agents, supra note 38, at 767–72 (noting that agencies are pressured to 
devote resources to successful investigations and prosecutors, who are also motivated to obtain 
convictions, can influence the agencies’ decision-making regarding which cases to pursue). 
Prosecutors prefer fewer cases or easier ones, while legislatures prefer easier ones. See id. If they are 
able to simultaneously keep their conviction rates up, all prosecutors (elected and line prosecutors) are 
likely to want to reduce their workloads. See id. 
 155. Revulsion towards the passage of Prohibition led to a repeal a mere 14 years later. See MARK 
THORNTON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROHIBITION (1991). See also Jonathan Barnett, The Rational 
Underenforcement of Vice Laws, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 433–35 (2002); Donald J. Boudreaux & 
A.C. Pritchard, The Price of Prohibition, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing how revenue 
generated by the tax system had a pivotal impact on the enactment and repeal of prohibition); Gerald 
E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 
23, 48 (1997).  
 156. See Stuntz, supra note 37, at 548. 
 157. See id.  
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. 
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than under-criminalizing or in spending resources to define the limits of 
the criminal law.160
Thus, the combination of the incentives of legislators and prosecutors, 
along with prosecutorial discretion, suggests that corporate criminal law 
and criminal law generally should be skewed towards expansion over 
time.161 That is precisely what we witness. 
D. Judges 
One might inquire whether judges are able to apply the metaphorical 
“brakes” on this process as they may presumably be less subject to the 
winds of public opinion.162 After all, many judges are not elected and are 
rarely blamed for a prosecution not leading to a conviction. Instead, the 
blame tends to fall on the prosecutor.163 Further, the esteem and culture of 
the judicial profession may provide judges with some incentive to curtail 
overly aggressive criminalization.164 In theory this might be the case, but 
in reality the structure of the criminal justice system urges against this. 
First, judges do not often get to determine which cases they will 
adjudicate.165 If cases plea out, as most do, then those cases are rarely 
subjected to serious judicial scrutiny.166 Further, the expansion of criminal 
statutes may tend to constrain the role of the courts because it reduces law 
creation opportunities.167 Finally, judicial doctrines such as vagueness, 
double jeopardy, and lenity are less effective when there are many fairly 
 160. See id. at 548–49. Even where legislatures have sought to limit discretion, prosecutors have 
been able to increase their bargaining power. See, e.g., Daniel P. Kessler & Anne M. Piehl, The Role of 
Discretion in the Criminal Justice System, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1998) (noting that replacing 
indeterminate sentencing laws with determinative sentencing laws has increased prosecutorial 
bargaining power not only for the specific crime but also factually similar crimes). 
 161.  See Stuntz, supra note 37, at 546–57. See also Phillip Pettit, Is Political Justice Politically 
Feasible?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 427, 430 (2002) [hereinafter Pettit] (noting the powerful role that 
popular sentiment plays in the expansion of the law in well-publicized types of crime, in our case 
corporate crime). 
 162. See Stuntz, supra note 37, at 541. 
 163. See id. at 540. 
 164. See id. at 541. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. at 567. Furthermore, judges might have other reasons for not aggressively patrolling 
the boundaries of the criminal law. For example, judges would probably not like to be reversed. See id. 
at 541. If so, and if the criminal law is seen as having enough support that it could lead to legislation 
overturning the judicial outcome, then judges might be cautious in overturning such laws. See id. at 
542. 
 167. See id. at 565. 
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precisely written criminal statutes.168 Thus, even the judges may not halt 
the trend toward increased criminalization. 
Corporate crime legislation then appears to be a method of satisfying 
public desires along with congressional and prosecutorial incentives at 
relatively low cost to corporate interests and within the constraints 
imposed by the lobbying activities of management and corporations. Thus, 
the growth of corporate criminal liability may be understandable from a 
political perspective, but what normative consequences follow?169  
 168. See id. at 528. 
 169. I have not discussed the case of the “street” criminal because the focus of this paper is 
corporate crime legislation. Nonetheless, there do not appear to be too many private interest groups 
that pipe up in support of the average street criminal or to constrain the breadth of criminalization. 
Most interest groups in the street crime context appear to target issues of criminal procedure, death 
penalty issues, and errors in judicial proceedings (e.g., erroneous convictions) rather than over-
criminalization. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) tends to favor changes in 
criminal procedural rules (see ACLU Webpage, at http://www.aclu.org/CriminalJustice/Criminal 
JusticeMain.cfm), which may not be that difficult to work around for prosecutors given the breadth of 
criminal law. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 26, 28–29 (1997) (noting that, although these constitutional 
protections favor the defendant, there is still much discretionary power left with a prosecutor); Kessler 
& Piehl, supra note 160. Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) is a national, non-profit 
organization composed of prisoners and their families that challenges mandatory minimum sentencing 
standards (not over-criminalization per se). FAMM, WHAT IS FAMM?, at http://www.famm.org/pdfs/ 
fedbroch2.pdf. There are academics who argue against the trend to over-criminalize, but I am not 
treating them as a “private interest group” in the sense that the phrase is usually used. See generally 
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 249–364 (1968); Coffee, supra note 4, 
at 234–38 (noting that the development of federal criminal law blurs the line between civil and 
criminal law, resulting in injustice); Stanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal 
Sanctions to Enforce Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963); Stuntz, supra note 37, at 
555. 
 One might query: why are there so few interest groups that lobby against over-criminalization? 
This may be due to perceptions that those who lobby against criminalization are likely either to 
stigmatize themselves or identify themselves as potential wrongdoers. See Delegation, supra note 33, 
at 776; Stuntz, supra note 37, at 555. Moreover, given prosecutorial discretion, we should not expect 
too many sympathetic defendants with which to lobby against over-criminalization. See Stuntz, supra 
note 37, at 555.  
 Furthermore, the putative “criminals” themselves are unlikely to have the resources and social 
capital needed to lobby for less restrictive criminal laws. See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, 
Colloquium: What Does it Mean to Practice Law “In the Interests of Justice” in the Twentieth-
Century?: Grieving Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1618 (2002) (noting that 
“criminal defendants have no powerful lobby at either the state or federal level”); Donald A. Dripps, 
Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 
1081 (1993) (arguing that “public choice theory suggests that an overwhelming preponderance of 
political incentives favor unrestricted enforcement of the criminal law”). Criminal defendants do, 
however, benefit from criminal defense attorney lobby groups such as the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. See NACDL, WEBPAGE, at http://www.criminaljustice.org. The defense 
attorney lobby concentrates its efforts on increased funding of public defense, defending attorney-
client privilege, and abolishing the death penalty, rather than over-criminalization. It should be noted 
that not all potential defendants are powerless. The National Rifle Association has successfully 
blocked a number of attempts to federalize various gun crimes. For example, an effort to close the 
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VI. NORMATIVE CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH CORPORATE CRIME 
LEGISLATION 
The analysis in this paper raises interesting normative questions and 
my discussion in this Part sketches my early thoughts on them. I argue that 
the normative implications of the substitution accounts depend both on the 
account relied upon and on one’s prior beliefs about the state of the world. 
For example, let us assume that we believe that corporate crime legislation 
leads to deflection of liability away from management. Is this normatively 
good or bad for society? To answer this question, let us consider the 
following example.  
Let us assume that to appropriately deter certain corporate wrongdoing 
we need to impose a penalty of $5 million in total on the various corporate 
participants. Further, it does not matter how liability is partitioned between 
managers and the corporation if they can bargain cheaply amongst 
themselves.170 This is because when bargaining is easy (i.e., transaction 
costs are low) the parties bargain for the socially desirable sharing of 
liability—this is a simple application of the Coase Theorem.171  
However, in reality, transaction costs are rarely zero and there is much 
evidence that suggests that bargaining between management and the 
corporation is rarely conducted in an “arm’s length” manner.172 In light of 
this, where we impose liability does matter because that is where liability 
is likely to rest. Consequently, we might prefer to place the lion’s share of 
liability on the corporation rather than the manager. This is because 
corporations (i.e., shareholders) are generally considered better risk-
bearers than managers for the reasons discussed earlier.173 Further, given 
that society might like to reduce the costs associated with risk-bearing, 
placing liability on the better risk-bearer might be the preferred option, and 
deflection helps to facilitate this.174  
“gun show loophole” (allowing purchasers to buy guns at gun shows without a background check) was 
defeated in the House. See H.R. Res. 249, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 170. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 34–35 (1996).  
 171. This is an application of the Coase Theorem. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 
J.L. ECON. 1 passim (1960). 
 172. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 764–74 (2002). I 
have assumed that the liability is shifted from managers to corporations. If we are dealing with a non-
management agent, then the contracting concerns might not be as large as when dealing with a 
management agent.  
 173. See Kraakman, supra note 109, at 864–65.  
 174. I assume that reducing risk-bearing costs is something that is socially desirable. See, e.g., 
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 75, at 240–41.  
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This account appears quite convincing for reducing risk-bearing costs 
of unintentional wrongdoing, but it is not so clear that the same holds for 
the intentional or knowing behavior of management.175 The reason is a 
familiar one from the insurance literature. Insurance companies do not 
provide coverage for an insured’s knowing or intentional behavior because 
then the insured would have an incentive to engage in the behavior in 
order to collect the insurance payout (i.e., a moral hazard).176 Analogous 
moral hazard problems might arise if we shifted liability for 
management’s knowing wrongdoing away from management and on to 
corporations when bargaining is difficult.177 This would in effect make the 
corporation an insurer for the knowing wrongdoing committed by 
management, thereby reducing management’s incentive not to engage in 
wrongdoing. Thus, when under-deterrence is a concern, deflection of 
liability for knowing wrongdoing worsens the situation.178  
The question is then whether liability is being shifted for unintentional 
wrongdoing or intentional/knowing wrongdoing by management. In the 
managerial criminal liability area there are instances of both kinds of 
wrongdoing,179 but as a general matter courts tend to require a showing of 
some mens rea before imposing criminal liability on an individual.180 
Thus, it is plausible that, if criminal liability is being shifted from 
management to the corporation due to corporate criminal liability, then it 
may be shifted for intentional or knowing wrongdoing.  
Of course, a counter-argument would be to argue that there is too much 
regulation and criminalization in the business sphere to begin with (i.e., 
 175. Where the wrongdoing is unintentional, management will evade liability by means of the 
business judgment rule. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (holding that 
management will be insulated provided that there is no showing of egregious carelessness). See also 
Joseph Sanders et al., Distributing Responsibility for Wrongdoing Inside Corporate Hierarchies: 
Public Judgments in Three Societies, 21 L. & SOC. INQ. 815, 838–39 (1996). 
 176. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 14–16 (1986) [hereinafter ABRAHAM]; ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, 
INSURANCE LAW 14–15 (1988) [hereinafter KEETON & WIDISS]. Standard issues that might be 
implicated here are moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard describes an insured individual’s 
potentially decreased incentive to avoid covered costs as well as to mitigate those costs, given that the 
individual knows that the injury will be covered by insurance. This can potentially lead to higher claim 
activity and under-deterrence of the group. Adverse selection occurs when higher-risk individuals, 
aware of their situation, purchase insurance, while at the same time, lower-risk people do not opt for 
coverage. This occurrence throws off the insurance company’s determination of the risk characteristics 
of a group and leads to more claims than the group, as a whole, would normally produce.  
 177. See ABRAHAM, supra note 176, at 14–16; KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 176, at 14–15.  
 178. Cf. Khanna, Top Management, supra note 6, at 1253–55; Coffee, Unscandalized Inquiry, 
supra note 90, at 408. 
 179. See Developments, supra note 11, at 1259–75.  
 180. See id. See BRICKEY, supra note 11, at 15, 81–84 tbl.1.  
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over-deterrence),181 and thus liability shifting for intentional “crimes” is 
desirable because it reduces risk-bearing for things that should not have 
been “crimes” in the first place. My interest is not in debating which 
particular state of the world (over- or under-deterrence) is correct—my 
point is simply that the normative implications depend on one’s beliefs 
about the state of the world. Thus, if we think over-deterrence of 
managerial behavior is a better description of reality, corporate criminal 
liability could be desirable if it reduces risk-bearing costs. However, if we 
think under-deterrence is more likely, then corporate criminal liability may 
impede deterrence by reducing the risk of liability on management for 
intentional or knowing wrongdoing.  
Let us then consider the other substitution thesis: that corporate crime 
legislation operates as a substitute for enhancements in corporate civil 
liability. Here, once again, normative implications depend on one’s 
starting point.  
Let us assume that we believe over-deterrence (too much regulation 
and criminalization) is the problem. In such a case, corporate crime 
legislation might be treated as the more desirable result because, relative to 
increases in corporate civil liability, it is easier to constrain (given 
prosecutors’ incentives and resources and budgetary lobbying) and 
imposes lower social costs. Simply put, corporate crime legislation may 
satisfy public desires without aggravating the over-deterrence problem as 
much as increases in corporate civil liability.182
On the other hand, under-deterrence leads to a somewhat different 
analysis. If we believe there is too little enforcement of laws regulating 
corporate wrongdoing, then an increase in corporate civil liability may be 
desirable because it may lead to more enforcement than corporate crime 
legislation. Thus, relying on corporate crime legislation as a substitute for 
increases in corporate civil liability may not strengthen deterrence as 
much.  
This, however, is not the only effect. Because corporate crime 
enforcement is less likely to be frivolous than some private civil litigation 
under corporate civil liability, it is more likely to be used in meritorious 
cases. However, given that corporate civil liability is composed of both 
 181. Cf. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 47, at 346–48.  
 182. See Backlash, supra note 8, at 240. For example, corporate criminal liability might have a 
lesser impact on deterrence than, say, repeal of the PSLRA. Note that from society’s perspective 
reducing litigation (or targeting it more carefully) through corporate crime legislation would be better 
than increasing litigation through corporate civil liability when over-deterrence is assumed to be the 
case. 
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government enforcement and private litigation, it is likely to be more 
numerous and frequent. Thus, corporate criminal liability is probably a 
more precise tool, whereas corporate civil liability is more frequent. Is the 
more precise tool or the more frequent one better for deterrence? There is 
no simple answer because the deterrent effect of the law depends not only 
on the frequency of its enforcement, but also its accuracy.183 One might 
think that increases in corporate civil liability are the better option, at 
present, because there have been measures undertaken that appeared to 
improve the quality of litigation (i.e., led to more meritorious suits), such 
as the PSLRA.184  
The normative implications can be quite complex. What is clear, 
however, is that those who start from the a priori view that corporate 
wrongdoing is not sufficiently deterred at present may want to argue for 
curtailing corporate criminal liability and increasing the focus on corporate 
civil liability and managerial liability. For example, if we think the 
deflection account is accurate and that under-deterrence is a concern then 
we should want to reduce deflection. We might achieve this by making 
sure that criminal trials for managers and their corporations are separate. 
We might also exercise prosecutorial discretion carefully in bringing 
charges.185 Similarly, those that believe corporate behavior is over-
 183. See Forrest G. Alogna, Double Jeopardy, Acquittal Appeals, and the Law-Fact Distinction, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 1131, 1140 (2001) (arguing that “[g]reater accuracy decreases acquittals of guilty 
defendants. Public perceptions of inaccuracy and inconsistency in the legal system may lessen the 
deterrent effect of punishment”); Michal S. Gal, Harmful Remedies: Optimal Reformation of 
Anticompetitive Contracts, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 91, 124 (2000) (noting that “[o]nce accuracy 
increases, the expected sanction for innocent acts disappears. This reduces the extent to which 
individuals are inefficiently induced to choose the act that does not subject them to the risk of 
sanctions, and thus stiffer sanctions and lower levels of enforcement can be adopted”); Louis Kaplow, 
The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 344–69 
(1994) (discussing how and why accuracy is valuable in the context of liability determinations). 
 184. See, e.g., Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? Class Actions Under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Working Paper No. 02-011, John M. Olin Center for Law & 
Economics, University of Michigan Law School (Draft 2003), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/ 
CentersAndPrograms/olin/abstracts/discussionpapers/2002/Johnson%20Nelson%20Pritchard%200201
1.pdf (arguing that the overall quality of suits post-PSLRA has improved). 
 185. For example, we might bring charges in ways that the deflection potential is reduced and 
where obtaining information from corporations about its agents is beneficial. Let us assume that there 
is some probability that managers/agents can be convicted, and that probability increases and 
approaches one as we obtain more information from the corporation about its managers/agents 
(assuming they are not simply scapegoats). Here corporate liability (civil or criminal) might generate 
information about agents that could be beneficial to prosecutors. Further, if the prosecutor uses the 
information and initiates a case against the manager and does not charge the corporation (or settles 
relatively soon), then deflection is not a concern, as the jury/decision-maker would not have the choice 
of the corporation, the manager, neither nor both. Moreover, if a corporation is not charged, then the 
costs associated with criminal procedural protections (many of which apply at or near trial) are 
avoided. This provides one scenario in which prosecuting corporations may not be too undesirable at 
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deterred should favor increasing corporate criminal liability, in the 
assumed political climate, to avoid more costly measures. The counter-
intuitive nature of many of these conclusions raises intriguing questions 
about whether it makes sense to regulate the business arena in the method 
we have.  
Indeed, the analysis in this paper raises many further important and 
interesting questions that could form the bases of separate papers in their 
own rights. For example, might the analysis here shed some light on 
aspects of the development of corporate civil liability? Might corporate 
civil liability deflect civil liability away from management as corporate 
criminal liability might deflect criminal liability? Finally, what explains 
the fact that the U.S. is an outlier in terms of corporate crime legislation 
compared to the rest of the world? Most other developed nations either 
have no corporate criminal liability or have a more restricted form of it 
compared to the U.S.186 The divergence on this issue is impressive and 
raises very interesting questions about why so much regulation in the U.S. 
takes a criminal form.187 Further research into these issues would be very 
illuminating.  
present (unless we can obtain the information about the agent through the application of corporate civil 
liability at a similar cost). 
 Another instance is where managers are clearly criminally liable for something quite harmful. 
Here there is little fear of deflection and also little to be gained from obtaining information from the 
corporation. Further, the procedural protections for corporations raise few additional costs over 
pursuing corporate civil liability because those hurdles would have been cleared in pursuing a manager 
criminally.  
 Of course, the other extreme—when no manager/agent can be found liable—is not an instance for 
corporate criminal prosecution. Although deflection is not a great concern (ex hypothesi it is unlikely 
that any manager/agent could be held liable), there is little benefit from obtaining information from the 
corporation because managers are not likely, ex hypothesi, to be convicted. Moreover, the procedural 
protections would have an additional cost over corporate civil liability as we cannot “piggyback” off of 
any managerial conviction(s). Thus, when managers are clearly liable or can be made clearly liable by 
obtaining information from the corporation, then prosecuting a corporation criminally may not be too 
costly (in the short run). Is this what we witness? This would be an excellent topic for future research.  
 It is worth noting that no method of exercising prosecutorial discretion can avoid the loss 
associated with enacting corporate crime legislation instead of something that might be more 
beneficial to deterrence (e.g., increases in corporate civil liability or managerial liability). 
 186. See id. at 1488–91; Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws? 22 (Draft 2002, 
on file with author) [hereinafter La Porta et al.]. 
 187. The “over-criminalization” in the U.S. is a matter that has been the subject of much scholarly 
writing. See Coffee, Reflections, supra note 4, at 210–13; Robinson & Darley, supra note 115, at 470; 
Stuntz, supra note 37, at 546–47. The divergence in approaches is particularly interesting, as the 
empirical evidence suggests that at least the criminal laws targeted to securities law violations do not 
appear to help in the development of well-functioning securities markets. See La Porta et al., supra 
note 186, at 28. 
 There are a few conjectures one might make about what could explain the difference in 
approaches amongst nations. One is that some countries, as a philosophical matter, reject the idea of 
vicarious criminal liability and hence would not countenance corporate criminal liability. For example, 
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VII. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS  
In this last Part, I examine alternative explanations for the growth of 
corporate crime legislation and argue that they do not alter my analysis. 
Let us begin with a potential public choice account commonly seen in the 
regulation area: that corporate crime legislation may benefit some 
incumbent firms by raising the costs of entering or remaining in business 
(i.e., raising entry barriers to the market).188 The incumbent firms that 
benefit from reduced competition would lobby for such corporate crime 
legislation.189 Might this provide an explanation for the growth of 
corporate crime legislation? I doubt that this is the case. 
First, as noted in Part III.A, corporate crime penalties are generally not 
very large and enforcement is infrequent.190 This suggests that corporate 
criminal liability may not be a large cost to businesses.191  
in Germany and Italy, there is no corporate crime legislation because criminal “guilt” can not be found 
through vicarious liability for fictional entities. See Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 
6, at 1488–91 (discussing historical concerns behind this). 
 Another is that if corporate crime legislation is a substitute for other liability strategies (e.g., 
increases in corporate civil liability and managerial liability) then in countries with small amounts of 
these other strategies one would not expect much corporate crime legislation. Most other countries 
have less corporate civil liability and managerial liability than the U.S., and hence corporate crime 
legislation would have less to substitute for in these other countries. These are both plausible 
explanations for the divergent treatment we observe in different countries, but other factors may also 
be at play. These include other historical and political constraints, the greater prevalence of 
corporations in everyday life in the U.S., the degree to which entrepreneurial attorneys influence 
litigation and legislation, and so forth. Also, the degree to which the general populace is invested in the 
securities markets may also influence the vigilance of Congress in regulating the securities markets 
because problems in those markets are likely to influence many voters. See Pettit, supra note 161, at 
430 (indicating that areas of law in the public light tend to experience change because public opinion 
stirs legal changes). These matters merit greater study and I am in the process of examining these 
issues in a separate project. 
 188. See generally GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT 
SEEKING (1989); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION (1991). 
 189. See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 22–25 
(1981); Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Interest Group Competition and the Organization 
of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees, 88 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1163 (1998); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public 
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward A Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990); Michael T. 
Maloney & Robert E. McCormic, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 99, 100–06 (1982); Mahoney, supra note 41, at 20–21; Sharon Oster, The Strategic use 
of Regulatory Investments by Industry Sub-Groups, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 604, 604 (1982); Peltzman, 
supra note 8, at 21; Stigler, supra note 19, at 3. 
 190. A total of 238 organizations received fines or restitution in the 2001 fiscal year. See UNITED 
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 51, 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/table51.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). 
 191. Moreover, even though the imposition of penalties is more common on smaller businesses 
than larger ones (supporting the dueling businesses notion) it is still not frequent enough to operate as 
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In addition, there is evidence that small firms (which newer firms tend 
to be) are sometimes treated better than larger firms. For example, under 
the organizational sentencing guidelines, smaller corporations (as 
determined by number of employees) are likely to receive smaller fines 
compared with similarly situated larger firms.192 Further, the primary 
method of obtaining a sanction reduction under the organizational 
sentencing guidelines—the presence of a reasonably effective compliance 
program—seems to favor smaller firms too.193 For example, the 
complexity and completeness of a “reasonably effective” compliance 
program tends to increase with the complexity and size of the 
corporation.194 Consequently, smaller firms are expected to have less 
onerous compliance programs than larger firms to earn a sentence 
reduction under the guidelines.195 This is not entirely consistent with an 
entry barrier account.196  
a real entry deterrent. See SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2001, supra note 41; 
Alexander, et al., supra note 41, at 403; First, supra note 41, at 3–5; Geraghty, supra note 41, at 338; 
Murphy, supra note 41, at 113; Rakoff, supra note 41, at 2; Davidson, supra note 41, at B3. Indeed, 
most prosecutions are against small distressed firms, which are the least likely to pose a serious entry 
threat (as they are already about to go out of the market as they are distressed) and unlikely to have the 
resources to put up a very strong defense. See SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2001, 
supra note 41; First, supra note 41, at 3–5; Geraghty, supra note 41, at 338; Davidson, supra note 41, 
at B3; Murphy, supra note 41, at 113; Rakoff, supra note 41, at 2.  
 192. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at §§ 8C2.5(b)(1)–(5). 
 193. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 99, at § VII (advising prosecutors to examine the compliance 
programs that corporations establish). 
 194. Cf. id. at 6–7. 
 195. See id. 
 196. Moreover, some regulations may even benefit smaller firms more directly. For example, in 
the securities regulation context, smaller issues can avoid a great deal of regulation by relying on a 
number of exemptions. 
 This may explain why there appears to be little interest by industry to lobby for regulatory 
competition. See Coates, supra note 143, at 543–53. Regulatory competition is the idea that permitting 
issuers to choose their own securities law (e.g., U.S. law, U.K. law), disclose this choice, and then 
permit trading anywhere would induce regulatory competition between jurisdictions and may in many 
instances lead to more responsive and efficient regulation. See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not 
Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory 
Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999); 
Howell Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2 
THEORETICAL INQ. IN L. 649 (2001); Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based 
Securities Regulation, 83 VA. L. REV. 1509 (1997); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); Howell Jackson & Eric Pan, Regulatory Competition in 
International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999 (Sept. 18, 2000) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
 If so, then we would expect to see firms lobbying for just this kind of regulatory competition, as 
that would mean the costs of raising money would decrease under more efficient systems. In spite of 
this, we do not see much lobbying by businesses in favor of regulatory competition. See Coates, supra 
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Further, if we wanted to provide a disincentive to enter the market we 
need not do so by threatening “criminal” liability for corporations. Civil 
liability would be sufficient, as both “criminal” and “civil” liability offer 
only monetary penalties against corporations, and civil liability is more 
frequent and often larger.197 That leaves us with the substitution theses 
discussed earlier in this paper.198  
note 143, at 565–61. Why might that be? One reason is that regulation already appears quite 
responsive to industry concerns. See id.  
 197. For example, it has been argued that the prosecution against Drexel Burnham and Michael 
Milken for various securities law violations was lobbied for by the corporate and investment banking 
establishment to impede competition from upstarts like Drexel and Milken. See Fischel & Sykes, 
supra note 47, at 347; DANIEL R. FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL 
MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (1995).  
 Regardless of the merits of this explanation, it is somewhat orthogonal to my analysis. Simply put, 
this account may explain why we have so much regulation and enforcement in the business sphere 
generally, but not specifically why there is so much criminal regulation. For example, even if the 
Drexel Burnham enforcement took on only a civil flavor, the same critiques still could have been 
levied against it. See id. at 347 (essentially doing just this). Indeed, we do not need corporate criminal 
liability to impose monetary costs on the Drexel Burnhams of the world—even enhanced civil 
sanctions would have a similar effect. 
 One could instead argue that regulation benefits industry by providing it with an imprimatur of 
trustworthiness if corporations meet these regulations (and correlatively identifies as “bad apples” 
those corporations that do not meet these regulations). See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards The 
Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate 
Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002) [hereinafter Cross-Listings] (discussing with 
supporting evidence how the U.S. securities laws may serve a bonding role for foreign issuers). Cf. 
Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305–08 (1976) (defining agency costs as including 
“bonding” costs). Professor Coffee argues that the U.S. securities laws operate as an assurance of 
transparent accounting and fairly good disclosure to many foreign issuers, and these issuers may cross-
list on U.S. markets to convey this assurance to their own or other investors. See Cross-Listings, supra. 
There is some support for this bonding hypothesis, and it provides a good explanation of foreign 
issuers’ behavior and also of the bonding role of securities regulation. See id. Might this explain the 
growth in corporate criminal liability? I have some doubts.  
 First, compliance with U.S. securities regulation is considered fairly well enforced, whereas 
corporate criminal liability is largely under-enforced. See id. (discussing enforcement under U.S. 
securities laws); SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2001, supra note 41; GRUNER, supra 
note 4, § 1.7.1, at 29–36 (noting problems with detection of corporate wrongdoing and enforcement); 
Alexander et al., supra note 41, at 403; First, infra note 41, at 3–5; Geraghty, supra note 41, at 338; 
Hughes, supra note 25, at 576–80 (noting that a number of new tools in civil enforcement arose in 
response to problems of enforcement and detection in the corporate crime area); Murphy, supra note 
41, at 113; Rakoff, supra note 41, at 2; Davidson, supra note 41, at B3. This suggests that the bonding 
story of securities regulation is based on some truth, whereas the bonding story of corporate criminal 
liability is based on illusion in some manner. One expects that the illusory nature of corporate criminal 
bonding would not go unnoticed by those who invest in such corporations.  
 Second, if we are relying on the bonding story it is not entirely clear why we need corporate 
criminal liability. We could instead rely on corporate civil liability, as the same assets are being put up 
as a bond: monetary ones (the only ones the corporation itself possesses). Even if we bring into 
consideration reputational penalties, there is little evidence that the reputational penalty from corporate 
criminal liability is any greater than the penalty from corporate civil liability when the underlying 
wrongdoing is held constant. See Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 6, at 1509.  
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Another political account could be that corporate crime legislation 
arises because politicians are using legislation to extract (or extort) rents 
from various groups.199 Although a very important political account more 
generally,200 in the context of corporate crime legislation it too seems 
implausible. Again, the infrequency of corporate crime enforcement and 
the relatively small penalties make one doubt the rent extraction potential. 
Indeed, rent extraction is more plausible under corporate civil liability 
where the penalties are larger and enforcement is more frequent. 
Furthermore, if rent extraction were a large concern, we might expect 
corporate lobbying against such legislation, but we rarely see such 
opposition by corporations.  
Finally, one might posit that corporate crime legislation could be in the 
public interest (i.e., socially desirable) and that this may give it some 
political strength.201 To the extent this claim relies on the notion that such 
legislation deters corporate wrongdoing, it rests on shaky footing. Earlier 
studies of the deterrent effect of corporate criminal liability, including my 
own, find little reason to think that it has much deterrent effect above that 
associated with corporate civil liability.202 Even if it did, one might then 
wonder why we see so little corporate opposition to these laws.  
 Also, it is not so clear that foreign companies can opt into U.S. corporate crime legislation as 
easily as opting into U.S. securities laws.  
 198. On a different note, one could argue that criminal law is better for politically motivated 
prosecutions because often the prosecutor need not show harm and can pursue criminal enforcement in 
cases where there is, arguably, little justification for regulation (because there may be no harm), 
whereas civil cases might be impeded by these considerations. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 47, at 
347–48. This, at best, provides only a partial explanation for corporate criminal liability. First, it 
provides little explanation for instances of criminal regulation where harm is required before an 
offense arises. Second, it is plausible that in some civil cases the government need not show harm 
either. If the legislature provides for civil sanctions even when there is no harm, then the moving party 
can recover in civil suits even if no harm is caused. Further, it is not clear why corporations and 
management would not oppose corporate criminal liability because of this feature. 
 199. See generally FRED MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, 
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997). 
 200. See id.; Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103 (2002) (discussing how the Tillman Act 
may have been supported by corporate interests to protect themselves from extortion by politicians). 
 201. The cost of gaining support, and therefore influence, is reduced when the interest promoted is 
a popular goal or one that increases efficiency. See Becker, supra note 8, at 390, 393; Beny, supra note 
8, at 22–23.  
 202. Indeed, some of my other papers suggest that certain critical aspects of corporate criminal 
liability are difficult to justify under a deterrence framework (e.g., the requirement of corporate mens 
rea, the increasing of corporate penalties because of top management involvement in wrongdoing). 
See, e.g., Khanna, Corporate Fault, supra note 6, at 382–84; Khanna, Top Management, supra note 6, 
at 1215–19. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Corporate crime is a perennial topic of discussion in the legislature, 
judiciary, academe, business board rooms, and polity at large. The recent 
spate of corporate wrongdoing has brought corporate crime to the forefront 
once again and led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This 
legislation adds to the already sprawling and ever-increasing area of 
corporate criminal liability.  
However, the continued and rather explosive growth of corporate crime 
legislation leaves a rather strange puzzle: How can such a state of affairs 
arise? After all, corporations and business interests are considered some of 
the most powerful and effective, if not the most powerful and effective, 
lobbyists in the country. Yet, we witness the continued expansion of 
legislation that criminalizes their behavior. What explains the growth of 
such legislation? 
My analysis suggests that corporate crime legislation may grow 
because it is a preferred response for corporate interests when some 
congressional action is inevitable. Most corporate crime legislation arises 
during a time of a weak economy and when many instances of corporate 
wrongdoing are revealed to the public. This generates a strong desire in 
the polity for enhanced regulation. Corporate criminal liability’s growth 
could then be explained by the following notions: (i) some degree of 
“punishment” is necessary, as a political matter, to satisfy public desires 
during recessions and economic downturns when revelations of corporate 
wrongdoing are numerous; and (ii) corporate crime legislation achieves 
this while imposing lower costs on business interests relative to other 
measures that could be undertaken (e.g., increasing corporate civil liability 
or managerial criminal sanctions). Corporate crime legislation then 
appears to be a relatively low-cost method of satisfying public desires 
along with congressional and prosecutorial incentives within the 
constraints imposed by the lobbying activities of management and 
corporations. Thus, the growth of corporate criminal liability may be 
understandable from a political economy perspective.203  
This then leaves a rather important question for us: if these political 
accounts provide an explanation for corporate crime legislation, what 
normative implications follow? My analysis suggests that the normative 
 203. I hasten to add, however, that these political accounts do not reflect the reasons for the initial 
development of corporate criminal liability, which came about to fill real enforcement gaps. However, 
the political accounts do provide some explanations for why corporate criminal liability has grown so 
much so recently when those enforcement gaps have largely dissipated.  
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implications are quite complex and depend largely on one’s prior beliefs 
about the world and which political account(s) one finds persuasive. 
However, one thing appears clear regardless of the preferred political 
account(s): if we start with the notion that corporate wrongdoing is not 
sufficiently deterred at present, then we would want to argue for curtailing 
corporate criminal liability and increasing the focus on corporate civil 
liability and managerial liability. This raises serious questions about how 
we regulate this area.  
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